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TERMINOLOGY 
 
To avoid confusion, I have used the term ‘CNP Consortium’ when I refer to 
the group of organisations co-ordinated in their opposition to the 
development plans by the Council for National Parks.  When I refer to the 
Council for National Parks, I refer only to that organisation, and not the 
consortium of groups which they co-ordinated.  The documents produced by 
the CNP Consortium were referenced during the public inquiry as ‘NPC’ 
documents, and although this acronym is slightly misleading in this context, 
I have kept it as it forms part of a system for the identification of each public 
inquiry document, of which there were many hundreds.  I use the slightly 
clumsy term ‘NCC/NNPA’ to refer to the Northumberland County Council 
and Northumberland National Park Authority, who presented a joint case at 
the Inquiry.  These documents are referenced as ‘NCC’ documents 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1997 a Public Inquiry was held to examine the Ministry of Defence’s 
(MoD) plans for the Otterburn Training Area (OTA).  Between April and 
October of that year, advocates and opponents of the scheme, their 
supporters and a range of interested parties (myself included) sat in a 
conference room in a hotel by Newcastle airport and listened to arguments 
about why the MoD should or should not be allowed to undertake a number 
of physical developments and carry out a particular type of training at the 
OTA, which lies almost wholly within the Northumberland National Park 
(see Figure 1).   
 
Ostensibly, this was simply a non-statutory local inquiry into a small 
planning dispute.  The MoD wished to use the OTA for training at 
regimental level with two of its artillery systems.  The local planning 
authority (Northumberland County Council and the Northumberland 
National Park Authority) and a consortium of local and national amenity and 
conservation groups under the umbrella of the Council for National Parks 
(hereafter CNP Consortium) disagreed.  The local planning authority and the 
CNP Consortium both argued that the developments proposed and the 
training that would take place afterwards would constitute a significant 
threat to the natural environment and recreation purposes of the 
Northumberland National Park.  The Inquiry was therefore an adjudicatory 
process for determining which uses should take precedence on this land.   
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But as I shall argue in this report, the Inquiry was also more than a local 
planning dispute.  First, it provided a unique insight into the land use and 
management strategies of one of the UK’s largest landowners, the  
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MoD.  With around 227,000 hectares (561,000 acres) freehold and 16,000 
hectares (39,500 acres) leasehold, and with various rights over a further 
270,000 hectares (667,000 acres), the Defence estate, as it is known, 
constitutes the second largest land holding in single ownership in the UK 
(House of Commons Defence Committee, 1994).  Operational requirements 
and the effects of a specific organisational culture have meant that, 
traditionally, information on the management and use of the Defence estate 
has been difficult to obtain.  The Otterburn Public Inquiry (hereafter OPI), a 
public event, resulted in the MoD’s management strategies for its lands 
being opened up for public scrutiny.  For those interested in this issue it 
provided unprecedented insight into the use of the Defence estate by the 
armed forces. 
 
The second point of significance for the Inquiry was that the arguments 
made for and against the developments in turn raised much broader and 
more abstract issues about land use in the countryside and even the very 
nature of rural areas.  For example, talk within the Inquiry of noise levels, 
black grouse breeding habits, visitor monitoring and local planning policy 
led to much wider debates about tranquillity in the countryside, conservation 
policies for protected species, access to National Parks and the potential and 
limitations of planning and environmental legislation.  An examination of 
these wider issues and the terms in which they were discussed shows how 
different groups view and understand rural areas.  An analysis of the 
evidence submitted to the Inquiry shows how these understandings - these 
different conceptual-isations of the countryside - sit within the context of the 
political aspirations, ideologies and moralities of the parties which produce 
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them.  The Inquiry also provided an opportunity to examine how these 
different conceptualisations of the countryside compete, intersect, agree and 
disagree.  Otterburn, like much of Britain’s countryside, is a contested space; 
the Inquiry provided a wealth of information on how that contest operates at 
both concrete and abstract levels. 
 
Finally, the Otterburn Public Inquiry was significant because of what it says 
about our attitudes towards warfare and militarism in contemporary Britain.  
Hidden from direct view for most of the Inquiry, yet underpinning much of 
the debate, were arguments about the need for a military capability and the 
extent to which we (society, if you like) are prepared to pay for this, 
economically and environmentally.  That these arguments were hidden 
speaks volumes about the power of discourses of militarism in shaping our 
thinking about the rights and wrongs of military land use.  Yet from where I 
sat as an observer at this inquiry, it seemed that these issues of militarism, 
defence and national security needed as much rigorous analysis and critical 
gaze as other more immediate concerns (wildlife conservation or public 
access, for example).  This analysis is necessary because ultimately it is 
discourses of militarism and ideologies of national security which will 
determine whether the developments at OTA should proceed or not.  It is 
important also because these same ideologies and discourses shape the 
outcome of other land use debates over current and former MoD lands.  The 
restructuring of the Defence estate is having pronounced local impacts in 
many parts of (particularly rural) Britain; the formulation of genuinely 
sustainable rural development strategies for such areas needs to proceed 
from a full understanding of the political, social and cultural context in 
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which this restructuring is based.  Ultimately, too, any contemporary 
analysis of issues of defence and militarism puts under scrutiny an institution 
(the armed forces) in the middle of a quite profound process of 
reorganisation for both international and domestic political and economic 
reasons.  The ‘Options for Change’ Programme (MoD, 1991) and the 1998 
Strategic Defence Review (which at the time of writing has yet to report) are 
just two manifestations of a broader process.  If that institution is to be 
remade in a form which maintains the endorsement of the majority, it needs 
to attend to their concerns.   
 
This research report is written in the spirit of critique and inquiry rather than 
as a more direct adjudication of the rights and wrongs of each case put to the 
Inquiry.  It is the view of a ‘critical bystander’, rather than that of an active 
participant in the debate.  The report draws on a range of sources, including 
most of the Otterburn Public Inquiry documentation, my notes of the cross-
examination of witnesses at the Inquiry, local and national government 
reports, academic publications and media coverage.  Informal conversations 
with Inquiry participants helped in the comprehension of many of these 
sources, and a long period of observation at the Inquiry itself provided 
insight into the trajectory of arguments and the use of documentary 
evidence.  I have not attempted comprehensive chronological reporting of all 
the debates as they unfolded during the Inquiry, but have reconstructed 
dialogues between parties with reference to a small number of themes.  Nor 
have I attempted to discuss all the issues raised at the Inquiry.  (See 
Appendix A for a full discussion of the research techniques and 
methodology.) 
 6
 
This report is about the politics of military land use, in its widest sense.  It 
takes as a starting point the argument that research into the use and 
management of the Defence estate is timely, given current political debates 
about its function and academic debates about the contested nature of 
Britain’s countryside.  The central thesis is that different groups choose to 
portray space and place in specific ways as part of a process of debate about 
rural land uses; an analysis of these debates about land use can be informed 
by an examination of those portrayals.  This analysis stands as a contribution 
towards current debates within rural studies on the necessity of academic 
investigation into the material and discursive operation of countryside 
conflicts and the conceptualisation of rurality (Murdoch and Pratt, 1993, 
1994; Pratt, 1996; Lowe et al, 1997).  This report looks at the ways in which 
the OTA was portrayed and its uses promoted or contested by the three main 
parties at the Public Inquiry.  It does this with reference to three themes.  
After a factual account of the background to the Inquiry and the stated 
concerns of each party there, successive chapters examine the issues relating 
to each theme.  The first theme is history.  How was the history of the area 
and the OTA told by each party, and what do these narratives tell us about 
the wider concerns of each storyteller?  The second theme is landscape.  
How was the landscape portrayed by each party, and to what ends?  The 
third theme is function.  What were the uses of this space, and how were 
those uses argued for?  The report concludes with a commentary on the 
relevance of studies of military land use to wider debates on the social 
construction of rural space. 
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CHAPTER 2 CONTEXT: THE 1997 OTTERBURN PUBLIC 
INQUIRY 
 
This chapter gives a brief account of the background to the Otterburn Public 
Inquiry, to set the scene for the discussion that follows in the remainder of the 
report.  It begins with the context for the formulation of the development 
plans for the Otterburn Training Area, looking at the tone of the initial 
Parliamentary debate and the terms in which the Ministry of Defence justified 
the developments during the initial plan preparation period.  It outlines the 
development plans proposed by the MoD before turning to the main 
objections made by the two major parties 
 
opposed to the development scheme.  The chapter then goes on to give a 
flavour of the course of the Public Inquiry. 
 
The story of the Otterburn developments begins with the Options for Change 
Programme (MoD, 1991).  This rolling programme of restructuring was the 
British armed forces’ response to the end of the so-called Cold War.  With 
the evaporation of perceived military threat from the (now dismantled) 
Soviet Union, British military capacity in Germany could be reduced.  The 
restructuring of the British army which followed involved a host of changes.  
The three most pertinent with regard to the future of Otterburn were first, the 
closure of the Soltau/Luneburg training area in Germany in June 1994; 
second, the relocation of certain artillery regiments within the UK; and third 
a more general reorganisation of the training lands used by the armed forces 
in the UK (Independent, 25 August 1994).   
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From December 1992, the issue of the future development of Otterburn was 
debated in both Houses of Parliament.  On the 8th December 1992, for 
example, questions were put to the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for Defence, Viscount Cranbourne, about the additional provision 
required at Otterburn as a result of Options for Change, and the possible 
environmental impacts of any development, given that the OTA sits almost 
wholly with the Northumberland National Park.  In an answer which set the 
tone for much of the parliamentary discussion of this issue over the next two 
years and the public discussion over the next five, Lord Cranbourne 
reassured the House of Lords of the Ministry of Defence’s commitment to 
National Parks, with the proviso that: 
The Government’s declared policy in respect of national parks 
recognises that training in them remains essential to military 
preparedness.  (Hansard, 1992) 
 
This argument positioned National Parks, and specifically the 
Northumberland National Park, as central to the UK’s defence capabilities.  
The possibility of a Public Inquiry into any major developments proposed 
for Otterburn was first raised at this point. 
 
Speculation continued to grow over the future of Otterburn (see Hansard 
1993, 1994a-g, 1995a and b).  Then in the Spring of 1995 the Ministry of 
Defence published three documents. The Military Justification for the 
Development of Otterburn Training Area (MoD, 1995a), Otterburn Training 
Area: Options for Change Proposals (MoD, 1995b) and Striking a Balance 
(MoD, 1995c), which set out in full the plans for the development of 
Otterburn Training Area, and give a clear indication of the strategy that 
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would be used in order to promote the MoD’s case for the developments.  
The press couldn’t resist the clichés.  ‘Army Fires Off First Salvo in the 
Battle of Otterburn’, said The Journal (11 April 1995).  ‘Environment 
Groups Target Firing Range in National Park’, said The Daily Telegraph 
(11th April 1995).  ‘Retreating Army Targets National Park for Big-gun 
Training’, said the Independent on Sunday (11th April 1995).  
‘Environmentalists Aim to Spike Army’s Big Guns’ ran the Financial Times 
headline (15th April 1995).   
 
The plans for development were formally submitted to the local planning 
authority as a Notice of Proposed Development (NoPD) in April 1995. 1  
These plans, as the headlines suggested, outlined the infrastructure which the 
MoD argued it needed to enable its artillery regiments to train at Otterburn 
using the Artillery System 90 (AS90) and the Multiple Launch Rocket 
System (MLRS).  These are tracked, self-propelled artillery systems.  They 
are heavy, weighing 45 and 25 tons respectively.  They are both deployed 
using fire and manoeuvre (or shoot and scoot) procedures; the operational 
principle of both systems is the location and destruction of the enemy, 
followed by rapid relocation to avoid incoming retaliatory fire.  The 
potential firepower, plus the mobility and manoeuvrability of these weapons 
systems make them lethal.  Anecdotal evidence attributed the destruction of 
                                                 
1 The National Park Committee, a committee of Northumberland County Council, was the original planning 
authority.  However, careful scrutiny of the development proposals revealed that part of the OTA to be 
developed lay outside the National Park.  The County Council therefore argued that it was the relevant 
planning authority for the whole scheme, rather than the National Park Committee, which by 1996 had 
become the National Park Authority and separate from the County Council following legislation under the 
1995 Environment Act establishing free-standing National Park Authorities for each national park.  This is 
a complex issue, and was the subject of much debate at the Inquiry.  Meanwhile, for the sake of clarity, the 
local planning authority here is held to be the County Council, although in reality the County Council and 
National Park Authority worked closely together in the scrutiny of the developments prior to the Inquiry, 
and presented a joint case at the Inquiry. 
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the Iraqi army on the Basra Road during the 1991 Gulf War to the power of 
the MLRS. 
 
In its Military Justification (MoD, 1995a) the MoD set out its case for the 
use of the Otterburn Training Area for training with these weapons.  
Locating its arguments squarely within a discourse of support for National 
Parks (the document opens with a quotation from Fit for the Future, a 1991 
Government statement on policies for the National Parks) the document 
outlined the need to develop the UK’s training areas, the training 
requirements of the AS90 and MLRS and the infrastructure requirements 
needed at OTA.  The core argument was that the space required to allow 
effective training by both artillery systems at regimental level was only 
available on two of the army’s eight Army Field Training Centres - 
Salisbury Plain and Otterburn.  However, the MoD argued that Salisbury 
Plain was already used to capacity.  Furthermore, the purchase of additional 
training areas in the UK and the use of overseas training areas such as the 
British Army Training Unit Suffield (BATUS) in Canada, were ruled out as 
either too costly or otherwise unacceptable.  Otterburn, the document 
argued, was the only option: 
OTA has the necessary range facilities for AS90 fire and 
manoeuvre, indeed it is considered to have the best artillery 
impact area in the UK.  The restricted impact area of Redesdale 
Ranges is 27 km2 and some 45 km2 is available for deployment, 
at distances between 2.5 km and 8.5 km for firing into 
Redesdale South and between 2.5 km and 11.5 km for firing 
into Redesdale North.  (MoD, 1995a, p.30) 
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The problem of the incompatibility of heavy weapons systems with the soft 
peat of the OTA was played down: 
Additional infrastructure would be required to facilitate tracked 
training, but the total length of new road/track needed would be 
fairly small; existing roads would be widened in the majority of 
cases.  Otterburn would not, therefore, allow free tactical 
manoeuvre but this, though desirable, is not absolutely essential 
to AS90 live firing.  All AS90 and MLRS deployment at OTA 
would take place on roads, tracks and hardstandings.  (MoD, 
1995a, p.30) 
 
The softness of the ground was not the only problem for MLRS and AS90 
training at the OTA.  The OTA sits within the Northumberland National 
Park.  Winning a public relations battle and convincing the public of the 
need to use this land for military training would be just as important as 
persuading the local planning authority not to object to the plans.  
Accordingly, the summary document outlining the main features of the 
Options for Change proposals and a non-technical summary of the 
Environmental Statement (MoD, 1995b and d) stressed the mitigation 
measures that would be used to counter any potential damage to the natural 
and cultural heritage of the area.   
 
Consultation with the local planning authority, with local and national 
amenity groups and local residents then followed the publication of the 
proposals.  Many respondents called for a Public Inquiry into the matter.  In 
Response to Consultation: A New Initiative by the MoD (MoD, 1996a) 
presented a set of modified proposals and a set of arguments by the MoD as 
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to why these developments would not constitute the catastrophe for the 
National Park that some opponents of the scheme had implied.   
 
The proposals finally submitted to the planning authority for approval by 
were as follows (see also MoD, 1996a; MoD, 1997).  Gun spurs would be 
built to accommodate the AS90s and MLRS rocket launchers whilst firing 
into the impact area. Of these, 5 existed at Otterburn already, 17 would be 
modifications of existing hardstandings and 24 would be new constructions.  
Those to be used by two guns (34 in all) would measure around 35m by 
25m.  A further 12 gun spurs would be larger (56.5m by 25m) to 
accommodate three guns simultaneously.  Four of the existing gun spurs 
would be large enough to accommodate six or more guns without 
modification.  Gun spurs would be constructed of dark coloured stone 
aggregate.  The gun spurs were to be grouped into six Gun Deployment 
Areas (GDAs) - Alpha, Bravo-Charlie, Delta, Echo, Foxtrot and 
Stewartshiels.  Each GDA would also contain a Battery Echelon Area for 
ammunition resupply, maintenance and other support functions, with a 
circuit of track and a parking area concealed within woodland. 
 
When manoeuvring between gun spurs, both artillery systems and their 
support vehicles would travel on the roads of the OTA.  These are mostly 
single track and between 2.5m and 3.5m wide, and too narrow to 
accommodate some of the vehicles within an AS90 and MLRS regiment.  
Some 57.5 km of existing roads and tracks would be widened to either 4m or 
5m, with an additional 1m hardshoulder, and an additional 15.3 km of new 
stone track would be built.  Of this, 3.1 km would form 18 Tactical 
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Observation Post positions, consisting of a network of linked stone tracks 
along a ridge line overlooking the Redesdale South impact area.  These 
would be used for target acquisition training.  In order to train in the use of 
tactical observation, 3 Technical Observation Posts would be built in the 
northern part of the training area, again looking into the Redesdale impact 
area.  These are effectively stone lay-bys measuring 40m by 10m.  A 4.45 
hectare Central Maintenance Facility would be required next to Otterburn 
Camp for vehicle maintenance.  Additional accommodation for 125 soldiers 
would be needed within the Otterburn Camp itself.  The existing airfield 
would be used as a Regimental Replenishment Point for training in the 
resupply of stores under tactical conditions.   
 
The MoD’s case for the developments rested on two sets of arguments.  The 
first was that the proposals set before the local planning authority were the 
irreducible minimum necessary to meet the operational requirements of the 
artillery.  The language used to make this argument drew on the idea of no 
compromise: 
The MoD has gone to great lengths to allay concerns about the 
proposals and take full account of the advice received from 
consultees.  The detail would, of course, be a matter for 
negotiation with the National Park Authority, but the MoD 
cannot envisage a substantially different approach proving 
acceptable.  The Army has a pressing need to train its highly 
sophisticated artillery regiments at Otterburn and a minimum 
level of infrastructure must be put in place if this training is to 
be effective.  46 gun spurs, the equivalent of 6 GDAs, 
Technical and Tactical OPs, a Central Maintenance Facility, a 
Regimental Replenishment Point and additional 
accommodation facilities are the minimum and this cannot (and 
has not been) compromised.  (MoD, 1996a, p. 27) 
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Within this argument, proof that the proposals did indeed constitute a 
‘minimum development necessary’ was emphasised.  In Response to 
Consultation: Meeting the Minimum Requirement talked of ‘two years of 
careful study’, of examining the issues ‘in detail’ and of comprehensive 
mitigation packages.  The document stressed the integrity and reliability of 
the MoD’s case for the use of Otterburn (MoD, 1996a).  Striking A Balance, 
a public relations document reinforcing the case for Otterburn as the place 
for heavy artillery training, emphasised the efforts made by those 
responsible for the most efficient use of the defence estate (MoD, 1995c).  
As this document title suggests, the second argument on which the MoD’s 
case rested was all about balance.  The MoD’s publicity documents about the 
scheme defined the issue of the developments as one of a balance between 
two sets of interests.  These were the need for a trained army on the one 
hand, and the need for due concern for the conservation of the natural and 
cultural heritage of a National Park on the other.  The MoD’s case, defined 
within these terms, was presented as constituting an even balance between 
these two interests, a moderate course or compromise chosen between the 
two objectives of military training and environmental conservation.  The 
question of a balance of interests lay at the heart of debates over the land use 
of Otterburn, and the success of the MoD in promoting the issue as one of 
balance is seen by the adoption of this language by the scheme’s opponents 
in debates at the OPI. 
 
In the Spring of 1996, the National Park, Highways & Transport, Planning 
and Policy & Resources Committees of the local planning authority (now the 
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Northumberland County Council) considered the proposed developments.  
The latter co-ordinated the responses of the first three and recommended that 
the County Council reject the plans in order that a Public Inquiry might be 
held to discuss the proposals.  On 15th May 1996 the full County Council 
meeting did so, citing eight reasons for objection (see NCC/P/1 and 
Northumberland County Council, 1996).  Objections were made on the 
grounds that: 
a) the development would have a damaging impact contrary to 
National Park purposes and Structure and Local Plan 
policies; 
  
b) the proposals did not strike an acceptable balance between 
military training requirements and National Park purposes; 
  
c) the MoD had not submitted sufficient information to 
demonstrate the need for the developments; 
  
d) the developments proposed were not shown to represent the 
irreducible minimum to meet training requirements; 
  
e) overall, the developments would constitute a cumulative 
impact resulting in intensification of military activity in the 
Park contrary to Local Plan policies; 
  
f) the proposals would lead to an unacceptable impact on 
properties and settlements in the vicinity of the OTA; 
  
g) the proposals for the movement of military equipment to and 
from the Training Area would have an unacceptable impact 
on the transport network outside the OTA; 
  
h) the mitigation and counterbalancing measures proposed 
would not offset the environmental harm resulting from the 
proposals. 
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The objections emanating from the Northumberland County Council deal 
quite specifically with policy and planning issues.  Concerns about the 
impact of the proposed developments on conservation, access and the 
general qualities of National Parks sprang from other bodies.  Following the 
publication of the MoD’s plans and the consultation period in 1995 a host of 
groups and individuals had made their objections known to the National 
Park Officer, the County Council, the MoD, to Members of Parliament and 
to many of the statutory and non-statutory countryside, amenity and 
environmental agencies.  The Council for National Parks, a national charity 
devoted to the promotion, protection and conservation of National Parks in 
England and Wales, co-ordinated a consortium of local and national amenity 
and conservation bodies in objecting to the proposals, the CNP Consortium.  
These were later summarised as a set of objections on the grounds that:  
‘[t]he proposed major development and military intensification: 
 
• detract from the natural beauty of the landscape and undermine 
the special character of the Northumberland National Park; 
  
• reduce the value of the Northumberland National Park as a 
national resource for a largely urban population; 
  
• erode naturalness, remoteness and tranquillity in a National Park 
where those qualities are particularly valued and represent the 
major contribution of the Northumberland National Park to the 
national stock of National Parks; 
  
• conflict with the National Park’s first purpose of conservation 
and enhancement of natural beauty, wildlife and cultural 
heritage; 
  
• compromise - at a national, regional and local level - the 
possibility for the public to understand the National Park 
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designation (by suggesting that National Parks are places where 
military training and live firing can take precedence over 
conservation and public enjoyment); 
  
• reduce opportunities for public enjoyment: the infrastructure, 
increased military activity and live firing detract from the 
enjoyment by the public of the special qualities of National 
Parks; 
  
• reduce the potential for future generations to enjoy National 
Parks at a time when their value is increasing; 
  
• undermine National Park qualities of striking scenery, 
remoteness and harmony between man and nature; 
  
• strike a blow at the integrity of both the Northumberland 
National Park and the integrity of the family of National Parks; 
  
• compromise the role the Government has given to National 
Parks as models for the sustainable management of the whole 
countryside; 
  
• militate against Government policies on Sustainable 
Development.’ (NPC/P/1, pp.5-6) 
 
In accordance with procedures set out in Part IV of Government Circular 
18/84, and in view of the formal objection to the proposals by the planning 
authority, the Secretary of State for the Environment decided that a non-
statutory local inquiry would be held to determine the matter.  In August 
1996 a letter notifying the relevant parties of this fact also set out the issues 
to be examined in the course of the inquiry (Government Office for the 
North East, 1996).  For the record, these were: 
a) the extent to which the proposals conflict with the 
Northumberland Structure Plan and Northumberland 
National Park Local Plan; 
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b) the extent to which the proposals conflict with the advice in 
Planning Policy Guidance Note 7; 
  
c) the implications of the proposals for the purposes and 
character of the Northumberland National Park, the extent to 
which any adverse impacts can be mitigated, and whether the 
mitigation and counter-balancing measures proposed by the 
MoD are sufficient to achieve the mitigation necessary; 
  
d) whether the infrastructure arising from the current proposals 
represents the irreducible minimum necessary to meet 
military training requirements; 
  
e) the implications of the proposals for highways and transport; 
  
f) the implications of the proposals for local residents, their 
properties and settlements, and on the local economy;  
  
g) any other relevant matter which may be raised at the inquiry. 
 
On 22nd April 1997, the Otterburn Public Inquiry began, sitting for a total of 
57 working days, across six months.    On the right-hand side of the room sat 
the MoD team of officers and consultants led by a legal team and Neil 
McLeod QC, instructed by the Treasury Solicitors.  On the left-hand side sat 
the Northumberland County Council and Northumberland National Park 
Authority team represented by Robert McCracken.  Behind them sat 
representatives from the CNP Consortium with their advocate, David Wolfe.  
Behind proponents and opponents of the scheme stood tables for Press (and 
researchers...), and at the back of the room were the public seats, full on the 
opening day, but soon home to only a handful of interested individuals.  
Facing all this was the Inspector, Peter McMaster, joined when the evidence 
required by a Landscape Assessor, Christopher Frost.  A table and chair 
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constituting the witness stand faced the Inspector and the audience, elevated 
on a small platform (or scaffold, as one Lieutenant Colonel joked, over 
coffee). 
 
The main parties presented evidence and were cross-examined on the 
following topics. After an opening Statement of Case, the Ministry of 
Defence gave evidence on the UK army’s training requirements, AS90 and 
MLRS training requirements, the level and pattern of training at Otterburn, 
nature conservation, cultural heritage, the Salisbury Plain Training Area, 
land use planning, landscape and visual impact, the moderation of adverse 
effects, estate management, noise, traffic and toxicity of MLRS rockets.  The 
Northumberland County Council and Northumberland National Park 
Authority gave evidence on land use planning, effects on the National Park, 
noise and traffic.  The Council for National Parks Consortium presented 
evidence on its main areas of objection, outlined above, and the views of 
representatives of the Youth Hostels Association, the National Association 
of Voluntary Countryside Wardens, the Northumberland Natural History 
Society, the Northumbria and Newcastle Society, the Northumberland and 
national branches of the Council for the Protection of Rural England and the 
Ramblers Association.  A local resident, Bill Short, presented evidence on 
the toxicity and pollution effects of the MLRS rocket.  The Northumberland 
County Lifeline Group presented evidence on the traffic implications of the 
developments, countered by evidence from the Highways Agency.  Powys 
County Council gave evidence about Sennybridge Training Area.  Some 
fifty members of the public also spoke to the Inquiry on topics ranging from 
the impact of military training on property values to the advantages of the 
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military presence to the local economy.  Over 150 letters were also written to 
the Inspector in support and in objection to the proposals.  (A full list of 
witnesses is given at Appendix B.) 
 
Many people commented to the press and informally during coffee breaks 
that the Inquiry was a waste of time and money; the MoD should be allowed 
to carry on with the developments it required without the delay and 
bureaucracy associated with an investigation of this kind.  My own opinion 
is to the contrary, for three reasons.  First, it appeared to me that the MoD 
approached the Inquiry, and presented themselves at it, with a degree of 
seriousness and a manner of intent which implied a determination to win, 
almost at any cost.  Of course, no organisation approaches a Public Inquiry 
lightly or flippantly, but the level of detail in the MoD’s case, the continual 
rebuttal and further rebuttal of contradictory evidence gave an impression of 
an organisation resolutely single-minded in its determination to win its case.  
This may not have been war, but it was certainly a crucial battle; the OPI 
was a test case for the MoD.  Winning the argument at the OPI would mean 
the endorsement of the MoD’s land use and management strategies for the 
Defence estate. 
 
Second (and again, this is my interpretation), I would argue that some of the 
parties came to the Inquiry not necessarily with a view to the possibility of 
winning the argument, but with an intention to see just how far they could 
proceed with the demolition of the MoD’s case through the advocacy of 
alternative viewpoints on land uses.  The two involve different strategies.  I 
would argue that particularly in the case of some representatives within the 
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CNP Consortium, a key motivation was not the idea that victory might be 
possible, but that opposition might more usefully entail a careful attention to 
the detail of the scheme in order to undermine its logic.  The OPI was 
important in this respect because it provided a location for the promotion of 
wider land use debates.  And perhaps the OPI was a minor skirmish on the 
margins of an entirely different battle. 
 
Third, the OPI was important because of the need to submit the proposals to 
full and proper scrutiny.  My interpretation of County Council 
documentation leads me to suggest that one reason for refusing planning 
permission and calling for a public inquiry in the first place was a 
recognition of the need to examine the proposals for Otterburn in far more 
detail than a local planning authority would be able.  The OPI was money 
well spent because it provided a forum for the full debate, of complex 
proposals, before an impartial adjudicator, in public, with full participation 
allowed.  Indeed, the Inspector was assiduous in ensuring that all parties and 
individuals who might have an interest, a question or a comment at any time 
during the proceedings, should get a chance to speak if they chose so to do.  
Speaking in public, and being questioned on ones views by a barrister, is a 
nerve-racking experience that may have deterred many.  It is a fact, though, 
that participatory opportunities such as this are rare within the British 
planning system and thus are of considerable value. 
 
This chapter has tried to give a flavour of the variety of topics discussed 
during the Inquiry.  This research report will concentrate on one issue 
amongst many, the portrayal of space and place by the three main parties at 
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the Inquiry, in order to understand how the politics of military land use, and 
opposition to that land use, work in practice.  The definition of ‘politics’ 
referred to in this report is a broad one of politics as a process.  Considering 
politics in this way includes consideration of the ways in which social and 
institutional practices are historically and geographically located.  It requires 
consideration of politics as they operate at both the material and discursive 
levels.  It means attending to the purposes and strategies of social action.  It 
also entails a consideration of the distribution of resources, which can be so 
critical in shaping political activity (after Painter, 1995).  All these practices 
are considered in relation to the debate over the Otterburn Training Area, 
and the contest between opposing arguments about the form and function of 
this place. 
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CHAPTER 3 MAKING HISTORY 
 
In this chapter, I look at the ways in which the history of the Otterburn 
Training Area was presented.  It’s a logical place to start an analysis of the 
contest between conflicting conceptualisations of the countryside.  The 
‘Battle for Otterburn’ began with a skirmish around the origins and history 
of the Otterburn Training Area.  My focus here is on the three main players 
at the Inquiry - the Ministry of Defence, the Northum-berland County 
Council/National Park Authority and the CNP Consortium.  Each of these 
parties told a different story about the past and its relationship to the present 
at Otterburn.  My argument is that by looking at the differences in emphasis 
between each story we can start to piece together the portrayals of the OTA 
by each group and the different understandings and conceptualisations of 
place that inform these portrayals.  We need to do this because we cannot 
understand fully the logic and trajectory of arguments made by different 
groups about land uses until we understand the ideas and ideologies, 
contexts and politics which inform those arguments.  Exploring these ideas 
and ideologies through their appearance in stories told about the history of a 
place provides a good starting point. 
 
Let us begin with the landowner, the Ministry of Defence.  The long history 
of military activity in this part of the Cheviots provides a basis on which the 
MoD’s claims to space are made.  This is put succinctly in an MoD 
publication on the archaeological heritage of the training area, entitled Fifty 
Centuries of Peace and War: 
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It is perhaps ironical that an area which was once the theatre of 
war for so many centuries should now be devoted to the self-
same pursuit - the methods may be different but the objective is 
identical.  (Charlton, 1996, p.50) 
 
This is less a case of irony and more a case of good fortune, for in its public 
pronouncements advocating the continued use of the Otterburn Training 
Area the MoD used to great effect the precedence granted to contemporary 
activities by historic military use.  For example, in a public access guide we 
are reminded that: 
The War Office bought 19,000 acres [7600 ha] of land in 
Redesdale in 1911 as an artillery range for the newly formed 
Territorial Army.  Horse drawn artillery batteries came from all 
over Britain by train to West Woodburn and marched up Dere 
Street (now the A68) to camp in tents and huts near High 
Rochester (Bremenium), just as the Roman Legions had done in 
Hadrian’s time.  (MoD and NNP, undated, npn) 
 
Current use is linked to the adoption of the area at the beginning of the 
century which in turn is linked to Roman activity at the beginning of the first 
millennium.  The Roman presence is very important symbolically to 
contemporary military claims to space, as it validates contemporary use: 
The tramp of armed marching men has long been a familiar sound 
in these Border hills.  For 300 years Roman soldiers controlled the 
country between Hadrian’s Wall and the Antonine Wall in 
Scotland, using a network of roads, marching camps and forts 
begun in about AD80. (MoD and NNP, undated, npn) 
 
There is serendipity in the archaeological excavation of this Roman 
inheritance.  An army officer joked informally to me that contemporary 
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plans to extend the road widths at Otterburn to 7 metres to accommodate the 
AS90 and MLRS would merely bring the modern roads up to Roman 
standards; archaeological evidence from Dere Street showed the Roman road 
to be 7 metres wide.  
 
It is the military use of Otterburn from the beginning of the twentieth 
century which really consolidates military claims to space.  The public 
access guide underlines this visually, setting pictures of troops in training 
alongside old photographs of military activity in the 1920s and 1930s.  Their 
use is subtle.  For example, a 1937 photograph of a ‘Karrier’ General 
Service Wagon stuck in soft ground emphasises the perennial problem at the 
OTA of manoeuvring over soft peat with heavy vehicles; hardstandings for 
vehicles are not a new and unprecedented requirement but the expected 
response to the challenges presented by the training area’s terrain.  Similarly, 
a photograph of two Vickers Medium Mark 2 tanks driving through 
Rochester puts paid to claims about the historic peace and tranquillity of the 
area shattered in modern times by the introduction of larger artillery systems.  
Older residents in support of the MoD maintained at the Inquiry that 
historically noise levels at Otterburn were far in excess of contemporary 
levels. 
 
The MoD’s claims about the rights conferred to it through occupancy and 
precedence are complemented by claims about the rights conferred through 
stewardship of that land.  This argument is absolutely central to the MoD’s 
claims to space at Otterburn.  OTA lies within the Northumberland National 
Park.  The relationships between military training and national park purposes 
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are highly complex and at times very difficult to reconcile.   The MoD 
simplify this by telling a story of the designation of this land as a National 
Park as the end result of MoD stewardship policies (see also Woodward, 
1997). 
It is an often forgotten fact that the Army has had a presence in 
the National Parks since long before they were designated as 
such.  At Otterburn, for example, the military training area was 
established in 1911, some 45 years before it was designated as a 
National Park.  [...]  There has been a military presence on 
Dartmoor since the early 19th century, again many years before 
the National Park was created.  (Nicholas Soames, Armed 
Forces Minister, Hansard, 1995c) 
 
According to this line of argument, the military presence was instrumental in 
securing national park status for areas such as the OTA:   
Although military training may not conform to the general 
perception of quiet enjoyment, it is often forgotten that it is that 
very military presence which has helped to preserve and secure 
the exceptionally beautiful and varied landscape which attracts 
so many visitors to the National Parks.  (Nicholas Soames, 
Armed Forces Minister, Hansard, 1995c) 
 
In his opening statement to the Public Inquiry, Counsel for the MoD 
expanded on this history: 
...military training had been taking place at Otterburn Training 
Area for over 40 years before it became part of a National Park; 
it will also be widely known that military training activities in 
National Parks were recognised as in being and likely to 
continue when the legislation creating National Parks was first 
introduced.  What is perhaps not so widely known, though now 
becoming more recognised, is the skill which the MoD has built 
up in managing its training area in such a way which actually 
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conserves and enhances landscape, ecological, and cultural 
heritage interests.  Otterburn Training Area is a very good 
example of this.  It is acknowledged, almost universally, that 
woodland and farming management practices on the training 
area have produced substantial benefits for the environment 
which are not present in large areas of the remainder of the 
Northumberland National Park.  (I/MoD/1, pp.4-5) 
 
As the last sentence of this quotation suggests, a key element of the MoD’s 
stewardship claims are assertions that the protection afforded to valued 
landscapes by the MoD presence has secured a greater degree of protection 
than that afforded to similar holdings within the National Park but beyond 
the training area boundary.  According to this argument, military training has 
protected the environment more than National Park status ever could.  One 
example used involves sheep; lower stocking rates required to enable more 
efficient military training result in the preservation of relict landscapes 
which have vanished in other parts of the National Park because of the 
introduction of more intensive agricultural practices.  Another example 
involves trees.  According to this argument, military use of the training area 
has prevented the afforestation by conifers that has been allowed in national 
park land outwith the training area during the 1940s and 1950s: 
Whilst some smaller sites on the Training Area were leased by 
MoD to the Forestry Commission for this purpose, it is without 
doubt that had it not been for Army occupation of the area, 
much of the current Training Area would have been planted up 
in that period.  (MoD/P/4, p.7) 
 
Arguments such as these can, of course, be countered.  The Northumberland 
County Council and National Park Authority argued, for example, that a 
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change in national forestry practices since the 1950s had protected the OTA 
from conifer cover as surely as MoD stewardship.  In any case, conifer 
plantations had been allowed at OTA, which suggested that the absence of 
trees was merely a fortuitous benefit of the demands of military training.  
The OTA would be more use to the armed forces as open moorland than as 
forest (OPI, 28th May 1997).  The point here is not to adjudicate on the 
rights and wrongs of the many arguments about MoD stewardship, but to 
illustrate that at any given opportunity at the Public Inquiry, the MoD took 
pains to emphasise the benefits of its stewardship policy for the conservation 
of a valued historic landscape (a point I return to in Chapter 5). 
 
The repeated stress on the successes of historical stewardship of the 
Otterburn ranges was a strategy used to legitimise the military occupation of 
this area.  Scepticism about the appropriateness of military training in a 
National Park was met by MoD arguments of sound land management and 
good conservation practices on the training area.  These claims were 
validated by the conferral of National Park status on the area.  In this 
process, the occupancy of the armed forces of this piece of land is 
legitimised.  A planning consultant representing the MoD at the Inquiry put 
it more bluntly than most when, in response to questions about the 
mitigation of adverse effects of the development scheme, he countered that 
the key point was that the MoD were there first.  The things that made the 
National Park attractive were due to MoD stewardship (OPI, 11th June 
1996). 
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Further legitimacy for the MoD case for the use of Otterburn for military 
training is found through wider debates about military training in National 
Parks more generally.  According to this history, the fact that established 
military training uses exist within many national park boundaries reflects the 
fact that ‘it has always been accepted, from the time of designation of 
National Parks, that military training would take place within them’ 
(MoD/P/3, p.5).  There has been public debate on this issue from the 
inception of National Parks in the 1930s.  The MoD made continual 
reference to various Government and Parliamentary statements supporting 
this argument, emphasising in its history of land use at Otterburn the point 
that successive Government statements had never stated that military uses 
should cease.  For example, Lord Silkin was quoted from the second reading 
of the National Parks Bill in 1949: 
I want to make it quite clear that I can give no guarantee 
whatever that it might not be essential to permit a certain 
amount of what some hon. Members will regard as undesirable 
development in the national parks areas.  It may be necessary in 
the future as it has been in the past to permit some part of the 
national park areas to be used for purposes of national defence.  
(Hansard , 31st March 1949, quoted in MoD/P/3, p.5) 
 
Baroness Sharp’s findings following her 1977 inquiry into military use of 
Dartmoor were also used in support of this argument.  For although she 
stated in a now well-worn phrase that military training was ‘discordant, 
incongruous and inconsistent’ with national park purposes, these purposes 
had never been accepted as paramount by Parliament or successive 
governments: 
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They must be balanced against other objectives of national 
policy.  There may be circumstances in which the proven needs 
of defence must take precedence.  (Cmnd 6837, 1977, p.1) 
 
These two examples give a flavour of a bigger debate, in which military use 
of National Parks was justified because it had never been unequivocally 
opposed by successive governments.  The justifications produced by the 
MoD for continued and even intensified use of the Otterburn Training Area 
followed on from this, emphasising need for land use on the basis of good 
stewardship.  The idea of balance was also critical here.  National park and 
military training interests were portrayed as two national needs which 
historically had been met through careful land use strategies. 
 
Opposing the developments planned for the Otterburn Training Area 
required a different history to be told about the area.  The MoD’s claims for 
a long-established interest in the area and an unblemished record of excellent 
stewardship had to be countered with a different interpretation of how that 
particular landscape came to be.  Some claims were more easily countered 
than others.  For example, the argument that the MoD was somehow 
responsible for the creation of the landscape at Otterburn was dismissed 
readily by the CNP Consortium with the retort that natural processes 
produced natural environments.  ‘The trees and curlews have been there 
since the last ice age,’ after all (OPI, 11th June 1997); 86 years of military 
occupation pale in comparison with the Holocene.   
 
Other statements by the MoD needed to be countered with a more structured 
narrative about this area.  For the CNP Consortium, this meant the 
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presentation of an alternative history of the OTA which emphasised the 
variety of environmental processes and cultural activities which had left their 
inscription on this place.2  The history of Otterburn, then, became one of the 
interplay of human and environmental events, rather than solely of human 
impact.  The landscape is valued less for the linear history written across it 
than for the variety of imprints it bears.  The human imprints stressed are 
also different from those talked about by the MoD.  For example: 
The historical associations are those of a wild Border 
landscape, the setting for Border raiders and (with the Scottish 
side of the Border) of the best-known of British narrative 
ballads.  Redesdale, on the English side, was a heartland of the 
clans of Border farmer-thieves.  It is likely that the influence of 
Border insecurity in inhibiting economic development for 
several centuries contributed to the wilderness qualities of the 
Northumberland National Park, and makes the moorland and 
semi-natural woodland landscape of the OTA relict and 
therefore of historic importance in two senses.  It is relict from 
the 16th and 17th centuries through to the 20th century (the 
bastles are a part of this), and it is relict within the 20th century 
while surrounding moorlands were afforested or experienced 
agricultural intensification.  (NPC/P/1a, p.7) 
 
According to this narrative, the history of the area lies with reivers, not 
Romans.  The CNP Consortium constructed a different history to the MoD.  
Also, stressing the variety of processes at work in the history of Otterburn 
was important to the CNP Consortium case.  It follows from this that all uses 
leave their mark, and with it equal claims to occupy that space.  In this 
narrative, no single use has ever taken precedence.   
                                                 
2 In this report, I present the CNP Consortium viewpoint perhaps as more monolithic and internally 
coherent than it was.  One thing I do not attempt to do here is assess the internal dynamics of this grouping, 
particularly the tensions between member organisations with regard to strategies and arguments.  This 
would complicate an already complex narrative, and is probably best examined in a separate publication. 
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This narrative argued that it was the variety of different imprints on the 
landscape that had led the Otterburn area to be designated as a National 
Park.  Furthermore, and in contrast to the MoD case, appreciation of the 
variety and value of this landscape did not, in the CNP Consortium narrative, 
spring forth without precedent in the 1930s and 1940s prior to national parks 
legislation, but was given a far longer history.  This history of appreciation, 
in the CNP Consortium narrative, goes back to the history of the Middle 
Marches inspiring poets such as Sir Walter Scott and Walter Swinburne, as 
well as later writers such as the historian G.M. Trevelyan.  For the 
Northumberland and Newcastle Society,  
...the area has long inspired a sensitive human response and [...] 
its landscape has rich cultural and historical associations.  It 
was the appreciation of these qualities which led the National 
Parks Commission to include the range area in the National 
Park and so led to the linkage of the Cheviots with Hadrians 
Wall to form one national park.  (NPC/P/3, p.9) 
 
The process of designation was described as taking place on the basis of 
‘detailed assessment’ and ‘careful deliberation’ conducted by the National 
Parks Commission in the 1950s (NPC/P/1, p.13).  Designation was therefore 
presented as a reflection of the value of the relicts of this rich history, and 
part of a longer history of appreciation of the area.  This narrative directly 
counters that of the MoD by arguing for the National Park designation as 
reflecting the area’s physical characteristics, evolved over centuries, and not 
the army’s stewardship in more recent times.  The history of Otterburn is 
then described in terms of the history of the National Parks, originally 
conceived of as: 
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...an extensive area of beautiful and relatively wild country in 
which, for the nation’s benefit and by appropriate national 
decision and action, (a) the characteristic landscape beauty is 
strictly preserved, (b) access and facilities for public open-air 
enjoyment are amply provided, (c) wildlife and buildings and 
places of architectural and historic interest are suitably 
protected, while (d) established farming use is effectively 
maintained.  (John Dower, 1945, quoted in NPC/P/1, p.9) 
 
Finally, the narrative of CNP Consortium emphasised how timeless this 
appreciation could be, by linking past appreciation with future needs: 
...it is no less essential [...] to preserve for the nation walking 
grounds and regions where young and old can enjoy the sight 
of unspoiled nature.  And it is not a question of physical 
exercise only, it is also a question of spiritual exercise and 
enjoyment.  It is a question of spiritual values.  Without vision 
the people perish and without sight of the beauty of nature the 
spiritual power of the British people will be atrophied.  (G.M. 
Trevelyan, 1938, quoted in NPC/P/1, p.9) 
 
The third history of the OTA presented at the public inquiry came from the 
Northumberland County Council and the Northumberland National Park 
Authority (NCC/NNPA).  In some respects, this history was not at variance 
with that of the MoD.  The public access guide linking Roman occupation 
with the present, for example, was a joint publication between the National 
Park Authority and the MoD; both bodies could be viewed as associated 
with the production of that particular argument.  Similarly, the idea that the 
appreciation of wilderness qualities has a distinctive history leading to the 
creation of the National Park appeared in proofs of evidence from the 
NCC/NNPA as well as the CNP Consortium.   
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But of course there are differences.  The NCC/NNPA’s history included a 
detailed picture of the story of land acquisition and development at the OTA 
over three pages of a proof of evidence (NCC/P/2, pp.12-15; the CNP also 
provided a detailed history; see NPC/P/1, pp.24-26).  The MoD’s proof of 
evidence told the story in one paragraph (MoD/P/4, p.25).  The 
NCC/NNPA’s detailed history told of a process of land acquisition in four 
distinct phases.  These were the creation of the core of the Redesdale Ranges 
in 1911; expansion during the Second World War; consolidation in the early 
1950s; and the acquisition of Stewartshiels Plantation in 1987.   
 
The NCC/NNPA’s close analysis of the detail of the expansion of the OTA 
served a number of purposes.  First, it implied that the NCC/NNPA had a 
good grasp of the history of the area - full local knowledge in the Geertzian 
sense (Geertz, 1983). This was not an authority with a distant and 
impressionistic view of the lands under its jurisdiction but rather an 
informed body with an eye for detail.  They might not have been military 
experts, but they knew what they were talking about when it came to 
military training areas.  Second, this detailed history provided an opportunity 
for the NCC/NNPA to start to present their arguments about intensification.  
A key objection to the scheme was that the Options for Change 
developments constituted significant intensification of use of the training 
area, as well as extending the footprint of physical development on the OTA.  
Arguments about intensification required quite detailed assessments of the 
past in order to sustain an argument about the future, hence the amount of 
detail on this in the NCC/NNPA’s case.  For example, they provided an 
analysis of records of training activity dating back to the 1950s in order to 
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argue that there had been a steady increase in training levels at Otterburn 
(OPI, 8 July 1997).  Similarly, an analysis of Notices of Proposed 
Development and General Development Orders since 1977 supported an 
argument that the footprint of development had extended significantly since 
the late 1980s.   
 
The third purpose served by a detailed account of the history of the OTA 
was that it revealed hidden opposition to military land use.  This was a detail 
lost in more broad-brush accounts of the history of the training area.  For 
example, developments in the immediate post-Second World War period 
were shown to have led to protests from amenity and recreation associations, 
which in turn led to a one-day public inquiry in June 1948.  The NCC/NNPA 
used this fact to consolidate its claims by finding historical precedent for its 
arguments: 
This Inquiry of almost 50 years ago has remarkable echoes for 
the present Inquiry.  Definition of the minimum military 
requirement and environmental thresholds was, as now, a 
central issue as the following extract from the Inquiry transcript 
reveals: 
“After all, Sir, this would not be the first time in human history 
when two absolute minima conflicted.  The business of 
government, as I understand, among other things is to reconcile 
conflicting absolute minima and to see where each can give 
way.  It has been done before and I have no doubt it can be 
done in the future. (J. Harvey-Robson for Pennine Way 
Association)” (NCC/P/2, p.13) 
 
As well as expanding on the history of the OTA to support its case, the 
NCC/NNPA also provided a history of its policies with regard to the 
 36
existence of military training in the Northumberland National Park.  This 
presented the National Park as an organisation continually engaged in the 
search for ‘reconciliation between two important national interests’, that is, 
national park and military training purposes.  An argument was presented 
which showed the NNPA and the National Park Committee which preceded 
it as consistently accepting the military presence, whilst trying to ensure that 
intensification did not take place.  Past versions of the National Park Plan 
were used to reiterate this.  For example, the 1977 First National Park Plan 
was quoted: 
The NPA have previously expressed the view that, whilst 
raising no objections in principle to the continued use of the 
Ranges, there should be no intensification of the activities 
carried on in terms of the boundary of the training area and the 
nature of the training involved and have subsequently 
suggested a regular review in order to monitor these aspects 
and ascertain the continued need for the training area.  
(NCC/P/2, p.20, emphases in proof) 
 
The 1984 First Review of the Plan reiterated this view, ‘despite advice 
received from the Countryside Commission to adopt a stronger line’:  
The Park Authority [...] adopt a realistic approach and accept 
the existence of the Training Area and, within this context, they 
will pursue policies which attempt as far as possible to 
reconcile military and national park purposes.   
The Park Authority are of the view that there should be no 
intensification of training activities and that the boundary of 
the Training Area should not be extended. (NCC/P/2, p.21, 
emphases in proof) 
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The Second Review of the Plan in 1994 again reiterated this view, 
consolidating the NNPA’s history of the Park’s managerial body as a 
continual search for reconciliation between two different land uses and 
against intensification of military land use.  Again, we see here the use of the 
language (and discourse) of balance, where military training and national 
park purposes are constructed as reconcilable issues. 
 
In conclusion, I have argued in this chapter that the three main parties at the 
OPI presented different histories of the training area.  The fact that they each 
independently wrote a history of the OPI in their proofs of evidence and 
supporting documentation was significant.  The function of history is the 
presentation of a narrative about the past in order to consolidate claims to the 
present and future.  The MoD stressed a history of occupancy to support 
arguments for future military development.  The CNP Consortium stressed a 
diversity of land uses in order to argue for the continuation of a National 
Park as a space for a multitude of activities.  The NCC/NNPA stressed their 
continual concern for military activity in order to support their claims of 
consistent opposition to military intensification on the ranges.  These 
histories also provide the basis for my explorations in the next chapter of the 
ways in which the landscape of the OTA was perceived and portrayed by 
each party, and to what ends. 
 38
CHAPTER 4 PAINTING LANDSCAPES 
 
This chapter looks at the ways in which the landscape of the OTA was 
portrayed by different parties at the OPI.  As I stated at the beginning, rather 
than seeing the OPI as a local planning dispute and adjudicating over the 
rights and wrongs of the development, my purpose is to view the Inquiry as 
part of a broader contest over different land uses in the countryside and 
different conceptualisations of rurality.  In order to understand this contest 
and its ramifications, we have to understand how this contest works, and we 
can proceed towards an understanding by looking at how that landscape is 
portrayed.  By looking at these portrayals closely and by examining the 
language used and the additional ideas referred to by that language (the 
discourses drawn upon, if you like), we can get an insight into the political 
motivations and underpinning ideologies supporting these different claims to 
space. 
 
This analysis starts with a simple observation: different groups view specific 
places and spaces in different ways.  It is an obvious point but necessary to 
make.  All the different parties speaking at the Inquiry based their arguments 
on their own portrayal of the OTA.  Of course, there was overlap between 
these portrayals; few would disagree that they saw the Training Area as an 
upland area, a remote place, with a landscape used for farming, military 
training and nature conservation.  But there were significant differences 
between the major players at the OPI in terms of how they portrayed the area 
to the Inquiry, differences which were rooted in the political motivations, 
ideologies and moralities behind these arguments. 
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The proofs of evidence to the Inquiry are good sources of contrasting 
portrayals.  The three paragraphs below show the similarities and differences 
quite clearly.  The CNP Consortium emphasised in their portrayal the point 
that the OTA was primarily a rare example of remote upland: 
...natural/semi-natural vegetation is a key attribute of the central 
and northern parts of the OTA.  The absence of modern conifer 
plantations, and extensive management of the hill farms, has 
resulted in the survival of an historic landscape - large tracts of 
open moorland, managed in a traditional way and breathtaking 
in their splendour.  Such environments are now very rare in 
Britain.  (NPC/P/1a, p.6) 
 
The Northumberland National Park Authority shared this view, but could not 
resist the opportunity to point out how military activity detracted from this: 
The OTA is largely composed of moorland with 80% of the 
land area falling in this category compared to 70% for the 
National Park as a whole.  There is little dense conifer cover 
and some thirty one widely distributed farmsteadings. The OTA 
therefore has “wilderness” qualities in abundance spoiled only 
by the scatter of military installations which is largely 
concentrated in the southern perimeter.  (NCC/P/2, p.9) 
 
The MoD disagreed, of course, and instead painted a picture of a varied 
landscape, where military activity failed to impose on the landscape quality 
of the area: 
The OTA landscape lies towards the northern boundary of the 
Park and includes parts of the Cheviots.  The training area has 
continued to be managed as an open moorland with scattered 
plantations and shelterwoods and retains many of the traditional 
landscape features which the Park Plan seeks to protect and 
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enhance.  Some elements of the military infrastructure are 
intrusive, but these are relatively localised and dispersed and 
have not diminished the scenic quality of the landscape as a 
whole.  (MoD/P/3, p.29) 
 
The different objectives of these three players - conservation, manage-ment 
and military use - are clear in these paragraphs.  This chapter explores these 
differences in the portrayal of landscape in detail, and discusses the 
objectives behind these different representations. 
 
Otterburn: too big to matter or too small to lose? 
I start by looking at the terms in which the size of the OTA was discussed.  
A common idea shared by the three main parties stressed the sheer size of 
the training area, extending as it does over 22,908 hectares.  All drew on 
Trevelyan’s notion of Northumberland as the ‘land of the far horizon’ to 
make this point.  The CNP Consortium quoted Trevelyan more extensively: 
In Northumberland alone, both heaven and earth are seen; we 
walk all day on long ridges, high enough to give far views of 
moor and valley, and the sense of solitude above the world 
below, yet so far distant from each other, and of such equal 
height, that we can watch the low skirting clouds as they ‘post 
o’er land and ocean without rest’.  It is the land of the far 
horizons.  (Trevelyan, 1934, p. 5, quoted in NPC/P/3, p.8 and 
NPC/P/1a, p.8) 
 
The Northumberland National Park Authority (NNPA) used this idea in 
many of their publications about the National Park, describing it as an area 
of ‘Remote and lonely hills, wide horizons and big skies; Northumberland 
National Park is unique in its sense of space and the breadth of its historical 
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legacy’ (Northumberland National Park, 1993, npn).  The emphasis for both 
the CNP Consortium and NNPA was on the sheer extent of the space, 
portrayed as almost limitless where users might feel free from the confines 
of the town and the restrictions of urban life.  This portrayal of the landscape 
of the OTA underpins arguments that development on the training area 
would spoil this feeling of space and openness.   
 
For the CNP Consortium, the size of the OTA was also relative.  Although 
huge, it was portrayed as the last remaining area of remote wilderness on an 
island where upland moorland is perceived to be under threat, a relict of a 
landscape type all but vanished elsewhere in Britain.  See, for example the 
statement by the Ramblers’ Association, members of the CNP Consortium: 
There are few parts of England that can offer walking country 
of such high quality with its grass covered, rounded green hills 
divided by steep valleys, all of interest, some possessing great 
beauty, some special intimacy and some both.  (NPC/P/2, p.6) 
 
The proposed developments would remove this last surviving example of a 
rare landscape type. 
 
Members of the CNP Consortium also talked about the sheer scale of the 
training area as a way of emphasising the inspirational, spiritual qualities of 
the OTA and National Park.  They talked of the landscape as being of the 
very highest quality ‘which provide[s] an experience appealing to all the 
senses and to Man’s [sic] inner needs’ (NPC/P/3, p.9).  This vast landscape 
was enjoyed by many for its characteristics of openness and its feel of 
wilderness.   Again, it was portrayed as the last of the ‘far horizons’, with its 
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attraction centring on the relatively unspoilt qualities of the landscape.  
Despite the MoD presence, the training area ‘still provides a very rare and 
moving experience for the sensitive visitor’ (NPC/P/3, p.7): 
No other National Park has still such a tangible sense of 
emptiness which by sight and sound gives Nature 
predominance over Man [sic].  In that wilderness the solitary 
spirit can find involvement of a deep quality and only the 
individual can truly appreciate it.  (NPC/P/3, p.8) 
 
Otterburn, it was stressed, constituted an ‘important reservoir of rural 
tranquillity in Northumberland’ and ‘is part of the largest remaining 
Tranquil Areas in England’ (NPC/P/9, p.5):   
The sound of the wind and, in spring and early summer, the 
songs and calls of skylark and curlew and the drumming of 
snipe, are part of tranquillity.  (NPC/P/1a, p.8) 
 
This portrayal of landscape emphasises the idea of its appreciation by the 
solo (male?) seeker of solitude and spiritual refreshment.  Access to this is a 
privilege, or perhaps the preserve of the privileged few who are able to make 
the journey up to the Cheviots.  This point about the feelings inspired by this 
vast landscape were echoed in many letters to the Inspector.  This is typical: 
The reason that living in the city is bearable, (the city of 
Newcastle), is that there is Northumberland to escape to.  Even 
if one is unable to go there, it makes life bearable to know that 
there is fresh air, there are rare bogs, there are lovely wild birds, 
there are beautiful clear rivers, in the National Park.  (Letter to 
Inspector, 2nd October 1997) 
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This portrayal of landscape as a reservoir of tranquility, potentially at risk 
from military infrastructure, was countered by the MoD who instead used 
the idea of the OTA as a huge space to underpin their claims on the relative 
insignificance of the proposed developments within this vast landscape.  A 
quotation from a book by the late Brian Redhead on the inspiration of 
landscape for artists was used to great effect in this argument: 
The Northumberland National Park is a landscape of wide open 
spaces, where access is unrivalled and solitude easily found.  
Seventy per cent of it is open moorland.  And yet it also 
contains the finest Roman monument in the land, the largest 
military training area in the north of England, and the biggest 
man-made lake and man-made forest in Europe. 
That is its majesty.  It is rich in history and yet it feels as if its 
geography has not been tampered with.  Every inch of it has a 
story to tell, stories of Roman occupation, of Christian 
conversion, of border conflict.  And every inch of it has been 
exploited, directly or indirectly. 
But it does not feel like that.  It feels as it must have always felt 
with the clouds on the horizon and the wide sky.  It is too large 
a landscape to be diminished by the activities upon it.  
(Redhead, 1995, quoted in MoD/R/3/1, p.7) 
 
Commenting on this portrayal of landscape, the MoD noted that: 
The quotation underlines the dominance and scale of the upland 
landscape which is such an important factor in assessing the 
effects of change. (MoD/R/3/1, p.7)  
  
The logic of this argument was that the developments were small and 
insignificant relative to the vast expanse of the Training Area which would 
accommodate them. With localised exceptions, the military presence 
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 ...is not intrusive and my overall impression of OTA is one of 
open moorlands and sheltered valleys with distant views and a 
sense of space.  (MoD/P/3, p.21) 
 
A fragmented landscape 
The composition of the landscape, in the sense of the relationships between 
the constituent parts and the whole, was also a key point in the depiction of 
landscape.  Again, different accounts of the landscape’s composition support 
different arguments as to the purpose of the area.  The MoD drew on 
descriptions of the National Park, used in the Northumberland Structure 
Plan, to represent the OTA as fragmented, as composed of a number of 
discrete areas rather than as a comprehensive unified entity: 
The dominant elements are the landform, the open moorland, 
wooded and cultivated valleys and the extensive conifer 
plantations.  These features combine together with historical 
and conservation associations to create a number of distinct 
landscape areas.  (MoD/P/3, p.19) 
 
The fragmentation of the landscape is not a strategy unique to the MoD at 
the OPI. For example, a Northumberland National Park Plan Working Paper 
identifies six broad areas within the National Park (including a Military 
Range area) subdivided into 41 smaller areas.  There are also precedents in 
the Countryside Commission’s National Countryside Character Maps, which 
identify three broad zones meeting within the Training Area - Border Moors 
and Forests, Northumberland Sandstone Hills and the Cheviots.  My 
argument here is that these subdivisions of the landscape provided a 
precedent for the MoD, which drew upon these techniques to describe the 
landscape as fragmented.  Accordingly, thirteen smaller areas were identified 
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within the OTA, an approach which ‘illustrates the wide variety of 
landscapes within OTA ranging from wild open moorland in the northern 
uplands to wooded and enclosed farmland on the south plateau slopes and 
valleys’ (MoD/P/3, p.21).   
 
The MoD did not do anything unique in dividing the landscape of the 
Training Area into smaller units, but it did do something very specific with 
the results of this exercise.  This subdivision was crucial because ‘the 
character areas have different abilities to absorb different types of 
development’ (MoD/P/3, p.21).  The subdivision was also useful because it 
then allowed the MoD to attach different values to different parts of the 
whole.  Rather than describing the entire landscape of the ranges as of very 
high quality, some parts could be granted higher value, in landscape terms, 
than others.   
 
An example of how this argument works, and the responses made to it, 
comes from the debates over the impact of Gun Deployment Area (GDA) 
Alpha on the Grasslees valley, in the south-eastern part of the OTA.  The 
plans for this part of the training area contained in the original NoPD, 
submitted in April 1995, were contested by the Northumberland National 
Park Authority on the grounds that the proposed configuration of gun spurs 
would have a major impact on the landscape quality of the Grasslees valley.  
Following the public consultation process, the revised plans removed some 
of the gun spurs to a new GDA in Stewartshiels Forest and relocated others 
within the area, and revised the configuration of the six gun spurs at GDA 
Alpha (Gun Spurs 1a, 1b, 1c, 7, 8 and 10) (MoD, 1996a).  One of these (Gun 
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Spur 7) would be used for firing the MLRS.  All the gun spurs in GDA 
Alpha would also be used for the dispersed deployment of a 6-gun AS90 
battery.  In the proofs of evidence to the Inquiry, the MoD recognised the 
quality of landscape of the valley, but emphasised that, relative to other parts 
of the training area, its quality was not so high: 
The qualities of the area include the contrasts and variations in 
the scenery of the Grasslees valley and the relatively unspoilt 
character of the landscape on the eastern edge of the Otterburn 
impact area.  In my view neither area possess the strong sense 
of remoteness which is regarded as the special quality of the 
Northumberland National Park because of the close proximity 
of farm buildings and the short distance of the area from the 
B6341 [road].  (MoD/P/3, p.48) 
 
In this argument, the landscape quality of the Grasslees valley, though 
recognised as high, was distinguished from other parts of the Training Area 
in the Park, and in this relative scheme judged to be relatively lower.  This 
argument was refuted by the CNP Consortium: 
...there is no logic in comparing the OTA only with the rest of 
the National Park and then saying that, because the Cheviots 
and Hadrians Wall are deemed of higher quality, the OTA is 
diminished.  As the landscape types are acknowledged to be 
different, why choose only the National Park for comparison?  
Why not compare it with similar upland moors in England?  
[...]  National Parks were identified precisely because their 
landscapes are, in general terms, of national significance and 
each differing component landscape contributes to the value of 
the integrity of the whole.  (I/NPC/87, p.19) 
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The Northumberland Branch of the Council for the Protection of Rural 
England, a member of the CNP Consortium, had very specific reservations 
about the impact of GDA Alpha on the Grasslees Valley: 
The proposed access (some 250m long) to gun spur 7 would 
run across undulating ground and a watercourse within a 
particularly attractive scenic location.  In my opinion, this 
would completely spoil the landscape.  The revised GDA Alpha 
is still a disturbing feature since it is proposed near an area 
relatively unaffected by military activities and in close 
proximity to popular visitor sites, including Lady’s Well at 
Holystone. The upgrading of the existing track leading to gun 
spurs 1a, 1b and 1c will be a prominent feature in the 
landscape.  There would be noise problems created by the firing 
of guns in these locations.  (NPC/P/9, p.7) 
 
Not so, said the MoD.  With reference to Gun Spur 1c, for example: 
...the gunspurs would not be intrusive by virtue of their 
relatively small scale in the landscape, the use of sympathetic 
materials, and their agricultural associations [...].  Other factors 
which reduce their impact on views are the attractions of other 
more distant views away from the line of the road and the 
distractions of prominent features such as Henry’s Wood which 
forms a conspicuous feature on the skyline in GDA Alpha.  
(MoD/R/3/1, p.15) 
 
According to this portrayal, the fragmentation of the landscape, and the 
sheer size of the area, would reduce the visual impact of physical 
development. 
 
The MoD’s approach was further questioned by the Landscape Assessor 
working with the Inspector.  In his replies, the MoD’s consultant on 
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landscape and visual impacts justified the fragmentation of the landscape 
with reference to the need to emphasise the differences with the OTA (OPI, 
1st May 1997): 
Q: The OTA is in a National Park, but we take that on 
board.  Within that, there are variations of sensitivity with it 
being in a National Park.  Some areas are only as sensitive as 
others outside the National Park. 
 
A: It’s clear that the National Park offers a level of 
protection.  A series of assessments where everything is high is 
not helpful in the decision-making process. 
 
Q: Why is this not helpful? 
 
A: Because it would dilute or suppress the clear and 
contrasting differences within the National Park and Otterburn 
Training Area.  So an effect, for example, close to Otterburn 
Camp may be of similar significance to an effect closer to the 
Cheviots.  Through a scoping exercise a clear consensus that 
there are differences within Otterburn is acknowledged.  
Different areas have different sensitivity, and those differences 
should come through in assessment.   
 
 
Assessing impacts3 
Each party at the OPI drew on particular ideas as to how the landscape of the 
training area appeared, in order to argue either for or against the construction 
of physical infrastructure there.  The portrayal of the likely impact of 
different parts of the development was therefore as important for each party 
as the portrayal of the landscape as it stood.  One of the more contentious 
elements to the overall scheme was the construction of the Tactical 
                                                 
3 I do not deal here with the vexed question of the correct procedures for Environmental Impact 
Assessment, but rather with the notion of impact assessment as a discursive process. 
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Observation Posts (Tactical OPs).   In this section, I examine how the 
construction and use of the Tactical OPs was described by the MoD in 
language which down-played the impact of this part of the development on 
the landscape.  I then go on to see how the opposition parties refuted the 
MoD’s arguments by talking-up the level of destruction which would follow 
the construction of the Tactical OPs.   
 
Tactical OPs are hardstandings for training in tactical observation of the 
enemy.  The development plans in the NoPD involved the construction of 18 
positions which would be used by single Warrior OPVs (‘armoured 
minibuses’ in the words of the CNP Consortium’s advocate) as part of the 
AS90 system.  The Tactical OPs would be spaced out along the length of a 
ridge facing north into the Redesdale South impact area.  Tactical training in 
target acquisition would take place here: 
The infrastructure [...] would enable OP crews to practise 
‘jockeying’  - running up to and, if need be, over the crest line 
to acquire the target in the impact area, before withdrawing out 
of sight.  The OP crew would then find another suitable 
position and reacquire the target to confirm or correct fire.  
(MoD, 1995d, p.23) 
 
Each position would be on a short spur track running up to the crest line, and 
these would be linked to an access track running along the reverse slope of 
the ridge stretching between two prominent view points, from Watty Bell’s 
Cairn at the eastern edge to the Crow Stone to the west.  Vehicles here 
would be out of sight of the impact area when on the track.  The original 
plans for the emplacement of the Tactical OPs required the widening of 
some 6.9 km of existing tarmac road to a width of 5 metres and the 
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construction of some 3.2 km of new stone track, again 5 metres in width.  
Following consultation, the plans were modified so that some parts of the 
existing road would remain at their existing width and other parts would be 
widened to a reduced specification.   
 
The MoD recognised the Tactical OPs as ‘one of the more significant 
elements of the MoD’s Proposals’  (MoD, 1995d, p.105).  After all, their 
construction involved laying new stone tracks in open moorland in a 
National Park.  The impact on the landscape was played down on the 
grounds that 
[the] effect of topography [...] would be to fragment views, so 
that only some of the road and/or track would be visible from 
any one point.  There are few higher points close by and, 
because of its location along a ridge line on the top of a convex 
hill, the central part of the infrastructure would not be very 
visible from lower elevations.  The main (public) view of 
Tactical OPs would be from the western end of the Cocklaw-
Holystone Road.  However, the road/tracks would be relatively 
inconspicuous at this distance and military vehicles would 
appear as small (and camouflaged) features in the landscape.  
The Burma Road is closed to the public when there is live firing 
on the Otterburn Ranges. (MoD, 1995d, p.105) 
 
The MoD make a point here which is critical to our understanding of their 
portrayal both of the area and the possible impact of the proposed 
development.  The impact on landscape through development was 
recognised only when there was human observation of that impact.  The 
MoD expressed concern about the visual intrusion of the development, but 
only insofar as it would be perceived by visitors to the National Park.  It is 
not that the MoD were arguing that the construction of the Tactical OPs 
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would have no impact at all.  The Environmental Statement, for example, 
recognised that the construction of the Tactical OPs on open moorland might 
have pronounced effects on landscape and ecology: 
The Tactical OPs would be developed in a high, moorland area 
with few existing tracks and buildings.  Construction would 
lead to fragmentation of the moorland and elevated levels of 
disturbance.  Increased disturbance is likely to result in a local 
reduction in the numbers of birds breeding and feeding in this 
area.  Increased levels of erosion are likely to occur until soils 
are stabilised.  (MoD, 1995d, p.148) 
 
However, the impacts that were presented as being most acute were those on 
human visitors: 
Special consideration has been given to the design of the tracks 
and spurs to minimise the extent of development and help to 
blend them into the landscape. (MoD/P/3, p.61) 
 
Furthermore, the ridge affected was portrayed not as an isolated, remote part 
of the training area, where development might intrude on the wilderness 
experience, but as a ridge already surrounded by evidence of military 
activity.  Military infrastructure such as barriers, red warning flags and 
existing tarmac roads were used as examples.  For the MoD, although this 
was open moorland with the attraction of distant views the location was by 
no means remote because of the proximity of the airfield and a road, 3 km 
and 1 km distant, respectively: 
Other values such as scenic quality and unspoilt character are 
also lower [...] because of the greater evidence of military 
activity and the orientation of the slopes towards the southern 
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(Redesdale) plateau which lacks the visual contrasts and drama 
of the northern uplands. (MoD/P/3, p.62) 
 
Overall: 
The construction of the Tactical OPs in open moorland would 
have an adverse effect on the character of the landscape in this 
area.  However substantial efforts have been made to moderate 
the magnitude of this effect through the selection of the track 
alignment and the general use of dark coloured stone surfaces.  
The effect on views would be small because of the undulating 
nature of the ground, the height of the ridge (reducing 
overview) and the restrictions on public access.  
The scenic quality of the area is diminished somewhat by the 
existing military infrastructure and the proposals would add to 
this effect by increasing the extent of built development along 
the ridgeline.  However, this effect would be mitigated by the 
relatively narrow width of the stone tracks and their close 
relationship to the landform.  (MoD/P/3, p.64) 
 
The National Park Authority were less sanguine about the Tactical OPs, 
objecting strongly to this element of the development plans: 
The construction of the Tactical OP tracks will have a major 
visual impact.  The ridge of high ground between the 
Crowstone and Watty Bell’s cairn is open and exposed 
moorland and between these two points there is no 
development.  The complex array of new tracks will be very 
prominent when seen from these two points and appear as a 
particularly discordant and unsightly feature.  The Crowstone is 
a viewpoint promoted in access literature for OTA and from 
here there are wide and dramatic views extending to the 
Cheviot Hills.  I believe the development will seriously 
disfigure this tract of landscape and completely alter its wild 
and unspoilt character.  (NCC/P/2, p.45) 
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In this portrayal, the landscape was presented as a public resource because of 
the views.  The views, and thus the public resource, would be spoilt by the 
development.  In rebuttal evidence (additional evidence to rebut points made 
in the evidence of other parties or in cross-examination), the MoD’s 
landscape consultant dismissed these claims: 
I do not share Mr. Carroll’s assessment that the Tactical OP 
would have a “major visual impact”.  The effect of the 
proposals on views from the viewpoint at Crow Stone and 
Watty Bells Cairn are largely restricted to the foreground of 
views to the east & south and would not detract from the 
dramatic views to the north.  (MoD/R/3/1, p.51) 
 
The MoD were consistent in downplaying the significance of the 
developments such as the Tactical OPs.  The MoD’s consultant on landscape 
and visual impact was questioned at length on the visual impact of the 
Tactical OP track by the NCC/NNPA’s Counsel.  The consultant was 
insistent.  Only one view counted, this being the view looking away from the 
development towards the north.  Looking in this direction (the one which 
counted) impacts would not be discernible: 
Q: When you’re at the Tactical OP, from the Crow Stone - 
that is a place where the feel is of moorland round about.  
You’re up on top of the world. 
 
A: There’s a magnificent view looking north. 
 
Q: Beyond, the brooding presence of the Cheviot to the 
north.  At right angles to the road, looking east to Watty Bell’s 
Cairn, is magnificent moorland. 
 
A: The view is to the north, with the higher ranges and the 
Cheviots.  The view to the south is moorland, a common 
feature. 
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Q: The eye is led into the valley of Wilkwood.  To the east, 
moorland, common in the area - its a characteristics for which 
the area has received designation as a national park.  
Photomontage 24 shows what you’ll put there - the Tactical OP 
tracks.  The feel at the Crowstone and the Burma road is 
characterised by remoteness. 
 
A: Its remote, but not so much as the Technical OP.  That 
gets a higher sensitivity rating. 
 
Q: Both are remote.  It’s a question of degree.   
(OPI, 30th April 1997) 
 
The Council for National Parks shared the NCC/NNPA’s view that the 
Tactical OPs would affect one of the qualities of the environment which 
contributed to the wilderness experience of the OTA.  They argued that the 
Tactical OPs: 
 [...] will very substantially intrude in this environment  -  the 
network of new tracks serving the tactical OPs is particularly 
damaging, injecting a strongly discordant feature into the 
landscape. (NPC/P/1a, p.9)   
 
Because of their location, the Tactical OPs would constitute a significant 
reduction in wilderness quality of the landscape (NPC/P/9, p.11): 
[The ridge is] one of the best ridges available for walking, set in 
the centre of the range and between impact areas, with fine 
views, particularly to the north.  It is characteristic of much of 
the rough moorland on the range.  The track and large number 
of spurs will be visually intrusive as the surface will be 
completely different in character from the surrounding 
vegetation and raised above the existing ground level, 
compartmentalising bits of moorland, completely taking away 
that wild and remote feel that is present.  (NPC/P/2, pp.7-8) 
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As I noted above, the MoD represented the impact of the Tactical OP 
primarily in human terms.  Whereas the impact of each element of the 
scheme in landscape and visual terms was assessed quite systematically, the 
evidence on the effects of development on environmental conservation paid 
far less attention to individual elements of the scheme.  Impacts were of 
course identified.  The Tactical OPs were considered areas ‘where more 
extensive habitat loss would occur’ (MoD/P/7, p.30).  However, there was 
far less detailed assessment.  It is tempting to interpret this as indicative of a 
portrayal of landscape as a human resource.  The CNP Consortium members 
with a specific interest in conservation took a different view.  Landscape was 
portrayed as inextricably part of the natural environment, rather than as a 
human construct and resource.  So, for example, descriptions of the impact 
of the construction of the Tactical OP stressed a portrayal of landscape as a 
natural environment, with the impact of the developments on flora and fauna 
emphasised, rather than the visual impact on a human visitor. 
The mires which will be damaged by the construction of the 
new tactical OPs road system, including the upgrading of the 
road leading to Watty Bell’s Cairn, have not retained as high a 
water-table as that at the head of Folly Sike, but - given the 
international and national importance of blanket mire and the 
very high status of Northumberland’s mires - their inevitable 
partial loss and damage by excavating a road network through 
them will be a loss to nature conservation.  Measures to 
minimise damage, especially the disposition of drains [...] 
underestimate the effects through the whole of a mire unit of 
lowering the water-table.  (NPC/P/1a/2, p.17)  
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This part of the training area was identified as a site for a black grouse lek 
(territory used for visual display by male birds).  CNP Consortium members 
argued that it should not be used before 9am in the period April to June to 
minimise disturbance to the black grouse as they go about their display 
rituals.  The large heath butterfly was also shown as a significant user of this 
site, which was portrayed as a critical location for the conservation of this 
species: 
Raised bog is a rare habitat with a variety of vegetation types.  
Sphagnum mosses of several types are key indicator species 
together with bog cotton and other sedges and grasses.  There 
are also animal indicator species, mostly the Large Heath 
(Coenonympha tullia), a rare and distinctive butterfly confined 
to wet mires where the caterpillars feed almost exclusively on 
Hare’s tail Cotton-grass (Eriophorum vaginatum), and the 
adults on the nectar of Cross-leaved Heather (Erica tetralix).  
Throughout this century it has become increasingly threatened 
in England by the progressive drainage of mires.  
Northumberland has a high proportion of the surviving English 
population and this species is therefore on the draft county red 
list.  Its future survival depends wholly on the continued 
existence of these ancient wet mires of which OTA has about 
100 ha remaining at 19 known sites.  (NPC/P/5/3, pp.53-4) 
 
For the Natural History Society of Northumbria, a member of the CNP 
Consortium, the adverse impact of the Tactical OPs on the natural 
environment were felt to be so severe as to warrant withdrawal of this 
element of the scheme from the NoPD. 
 
Visual portrayals of landscape 
Arguments can be constructed through pictures as well as word.  The 
representations of landscape presented by each party to the Inquiry drew on 
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language and also on visual images.  These were used far less frequently, but 
deserve some consideration because of the effect of their use.  
Photomontages, maps and photographs all contributed to the portrayal of 
landscape. 
 
Photomontages produced by consultants working for the MoD portrayed the 
impact of the proposed development on the landscape.  Thirty-three 
appeared in an A3 sized appendix to the Landscape and Visual Impact proof 
of evidence.  A photomontage is ‘the superimposition of an image onto a 
photograph for the purpose of creating a realistic representation of proposed 
or potential changes to a view.  This can be done manually by hand 
rendering, or by using computer imagery’ (MoD/P/3/Ph, npn).  The 
technique followed guidelines recommended by the Landscape Institute of 
Environmental Assessment: 
The methodology [...]  uses a series of photographs to create a 
panorama in accordance with general practice.  In many cases 
this approach does not do justice to the sweeping horizons of 
the Northumberland landscape and it is intended that the 
photomontage would supplement the Inspector’s own 
assessment from site visits.  (MoD/P/3/Ph, npn) 
 
The MoD found the technique useful for showing various parts of the 
landscape ‘before’ and ‘after’ development, and to consolidate their claims 
that the proposed developments would have little deleterious impact on the 
landscape.  Yet as the above quotation suggests, this is not a perfect 
technique.  Opponents of the scheme seemed to take some pleasure in 
pointing out further flaws to this rather bewitching visual technique. 
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For example, one set of ‘before’ and ‘after’ photomontages were used by a 
member of the CNP Consortium to make a point that photomontages can 
rely for their effect on an optical illusion.  This particular set showed a road 
before and after widening.  The landscape consultant responsible was asked: 
Q: See Photomontage 18.  Which of the two roads appears 
wider? 
 
A: Ah!  The top one because it’s darker. 
(OPI, 1st May 1997) 
 
The point was that although the roads shown in each photograph were of 
equal width, the road in the ‘before’ (top) photograph, placed above the 
‘after’ photomontage made the top road appear wider, because of the optical 
illusion created by two sets of lines converging towards a distant point.  The 
technique was potentially fallible. 
 
Also critical in the use of this technique was the choice of locations and 
aspects of the development for inclusion in the collection of photomontages.  
Again, the interchange is between the MoD’s landscape consultant and the 
NCC’s Counsel: 
Q: Photomontage 32 shows the approach to gun spur 38, 
amended to show its full width.  This is an interesting 
photomontage.  I may have missed some, but I’m wondering 
where I’d find a photomontage of a 3-gun gun spur, 56m by 
25m.  Do we see one? 
 
A:  No. 
 
Q: But it would be relevant to the Inspector to have a sense 
of what this would look like? 
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A: I’m not sure what the Inspector would find helpful.  The 
photomontages were selected on the basis of the principal roads 
used.  Gun spurs 10 and 19 are 3-gun gun spurs.  Number 19 
has access and some infrastructure there at the moment.  No. 10 
is on a slight rise and is not visible from the road.  There was 
not the time or resources for the selection of these, and this was 
not a particular issue raised by the National Park Authority.   
(OPI, 1st May 1997) 
In his concluding statement, Counsel for the NCC/NPA went on to criticise 
the absence of a photomontage of a view along a gun spur access track at 90 
degrees from the road, and the lack of an illustration of a 12 metre wide 
access track (I/NCC/36, p.29).  The point I am making here is not that the 
inclusion or omission of various views of the landscape and development 
supported or undermined either case, but rather that this rather attractive and 
impressive-looking technique could be used for a number of conflicting 
purposes in the portrayal of landscape.4 
Maps were another visual source significant to the portrayal of landscape at 
the Public Inquiry.  The Inspector himself, Peter McMaster, was a former 
Director General of the Ordnance Survey.  Maps appeared as battered fold-
out OS 1:50,000 Landranger sheets, muddied and rain-splattered through 
practical use.  Or they appeared as large 1:25,000 MoD range maps 
overlaying the familiar Ordnance Survey markings with danger zones, 
impact areas, field firing areas, anti-tank ranges and demolition areas.  Large 
scale cartoon-type maps of landscape character areas carved up the region to 
suggest, as I discussed above, the heterogeneous nature of the area’s 
                                                 
4 Photographs were used sparingly, and I do not discuss them here, beyond drawing a comparison between 
the colour reproductions of photographs of environmental improvements, produced by the MoD, and the 
rather vague black and white stills produced at one stage by the Council for National Parks Consortium to 
counter the claims of the photomontages.  The CNP were criticised for the quality of the photographs.  It 
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geomorphology and habitats.  Finely-drawn 1:10,000 maps produced by 
MoD surveyors showed the precise locations for gun spurs, stone tracks, 
battery echelon areas and technical observation posts whilst 1:500 
engineering plans plotted out their detail.  And plain white sheets appeared 
time and time again, scattered with red dots, blue dots, pink lines and green 
squiggles; no scale.  These were the maps that were used to illustrate the 
infrastructure developments that the MoD wished to undertake. 
If we follow Brian Harley, Mark Monmonier and others in approaching 
maps not as part of an objective scientific system but as part of a cultural 
system, the role of the map in the portrayal of Otterburn turns from neutral 
descriptive tool to active participant in the construction of portrayals of 
place.  As Brian Harley notes, the ‘quest to map’ or ‘mapping impulse’ 
replicates the ‘territorial imperatives of a particular system’ (Harley, 1988, 
p.278).  I do this too, of course; see Figure 1.  In both cases, the territorial 
imperative is the portrayal of space for specific purposes.5  At the OPI, maps 
achieved this in two ways, either by supporting the army’s claims for the 
functions it wished to conduct over this particular space, or by supporting 
the army in its existing, relatively unhindered use of space.  As Mark 
Monmonier points out, no map is capable of including all information and 
telling all stories: 
[The] process of mapping requires cartographers to limit 
content in order to create a readable map and so allows them to 
manipulate their audience with the information they choose to 
include.  (Monmonier, 1995, p.1)   
                                                                                                                                                 
seemed at the time that a small charity with few resources could do little to counter the techniques at the 
disposal of a larger Government ministry. 
5 The history of cartography is of course inextricably bound with the history of the British armed forces, 
particularly their role in enabling imperial expansion during the latter half of the 19th century. 
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This observation often came to mind when examining the drawings 
produced by engineering consultants White Young for the MoD to show the 
proposed developments.  The information included is minimal.  Brian 
Harley’s observations on a North American road atlas are also pertinent 
here.  He talks with reference to the effect of these maps on North 
Americans’ perceptions of their country.  His observations could apply to the 
rather anonymous maps produced to illustrate the developments: 
What sort of image of America [Otterburn?] do these atlases 
[maps] promote?  On the one hand, there is a patina of gross 
simplicity.  Once off the interstate highways the landscape 
dissolves into a generic world of bare essentials that invites no 
exploration.  It avoids the irregularities of lived experience.  
Context is stripped away and place is no longer important.  On 
the other hand, the maps reveal the ambivalence of all 
stereotypes.  Their silences are also inscribed on the page: 
where, on the page, is the variety of nature, where is the history 
of the landscape, and where is the space-time of human 
experience in such anonymized maps?  (Harley 1992 p. 246) 
 
The White Young maps showed a plain white surface.  There are no 
contours, no idea of the shape of the land, no suggestion of human habitation 
or conversely the wilderness celebrated by poets and writers, no local 
landmarks, no existing roads.  This could be anywhere or nowhere.  This 
representation is so highly abstracted that it doesn’t even appear to pretend 
to have any reference to the ‘reality’ it purports to illustrate.  It is 
meaningless unless you have an intimate knowledge of the geography of this 
part of Northumberland.  What is shown are the new and improved tracks, 
new and existing gun spur locations, existing and proposed woodland areas 
and the Central Maintenance Facility.  The development is presented as 
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taking place in an empty space marked only by two features of army 
infrastructure: the OTA boundary and the two camps at Otterburn and 
Redesdale.  A local resident made a similar point when arguing that military 
use of the ranges had obliterated a previous history of settlement and land 
use by ceasing to use particular place-names: 
I often wonder when studying maps of the Upper Coquet 
Valley - who was Jock of Jock’s Knowe road; or Watty Bell of 
Watty Bell’s cairn etc. etc.  Just occasionally the map’s secrets 
are given up as for instance when a local told me that 
Dykeham’s Edge was named after a whisky smuggler who 
safeguarded himself, and his grey hens of mountain dew, in a 
nearby cave the entrance to which was cunningly hidden.  [...]  I 
doubt that future residents in the Upper Coquet Valley will be 
much excited by the characters Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, et 
al.  Once you have altered, and even obliterated, names from a 
map (Dykeham’s Edge has disappeared cartographically) you 
obliterate the lives of the inhabitants and deny their legacy of 
heritage.  (Evidence of Harbottle resident to OPI, 7th October 
1997). 
 
Local knowledge and the portrayal of landscape 
The arguments discussed in this chapter on the impacts of the proposed 
developments ultimately all stood relative to one another.  Their validity 
ultimately depended on interpretation and judgement as to which portrayal 
of landscape was the most convincing.  These arguments were often 
substantiated only with difficulty.  To conclude this section, it is worth 
making a point about how validity in interpretation was established.  I have 
already noted how local knowledge was used by the National Park Authority 
to legitimate its claims to know this contested space and thus to predict 
likely outcomes of the proposed developments.  Local knowledge also 
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seemed crucial in establishing the legitimacy of different interpretations of 
landscape.  
 
The portrayals of the landscape at Otterburn constructed in the course of the 
Inquiry appeared in proofs of evidence and witness statements, cross-
examinations and rebuttal evidence. Often they appeared in documents that 
had been drafted and re-drafted over a period of months.  Furthermore, many 
of the people giving evidence at the Inquiry claimed a long and intimate 
knowledge of the training area, and presented a picture of a place they felt 
they knew well.  Others, brought in as consultants and representatives to the 
different parties, had to acquire knowledge of the area rather more quickly.  
Often they were based elsewhere and not able to build up a picture over a 
long period of association.  Yet all the evidence presented for and against the 
developments needed to appear rooted in direct experience of the area.  
Everyone had to claim local knowledge to substantiate their case.  Many 
witnesses were picked up on this issue.  For example, one unfortunate MoD 
witness was asked about the use of a road by military vehicles.  He replied 
that he was unsure when he wrote his proof of evidence whether the road in 
question was open to the public (OPI, 1st May 1997).  In the debate over the 
bog at the Tactical OP (to which I return in the next chapter) the precise 
name and location of this feature caused considerable debate, with each 
party claiming superior local knowledge.  A CNP Consortium witness, 
arguing for increased public access, talked knowingly of his many years’ 
experience on the hills of the Cheviot Dry Training Area, only to be told that 
he had been technically out of bounds by straying off the public rights of 
way all this time.  He seemed most surprised.  An MoD representative with 
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good knowledge of the OTA appeared during cross-examination not to know 
about the existence of a public bridleway near Otterburn Camp.  Another 
was questioned as to whether he would recognise a curlew, the symbol of the 
National Park, if he saw one.6  Counsel for the NCC/NNPA appeared to take 
delight in talking knowingly of small features such as buildings, roads, 
junctions and footpaths, establishing a high level of local knowledge.  In 
turn, Counsel for the MoD took many a witness to task by testing their 
knowledge of the details of the NoPD, and finding them wanting.  Of course, 
these are partly strategies used by advocates as part of their brief.  But they 
also seemed to be used to validate or alternatively destabilise portrayals of 
landscape.  Local knowledge was vital. 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has focussed on the portrayal of the landscape of 
the OTA, looking at how it was described by each of the three main parties 
at the Inquiry.  These descriptions were all part of a political process, with 
purpose and strategy, and directed towards the support of a particular case.  
These descriptions can also be understood as discursive, in that they draw on 
wider patterns of statements or systems of concepts in order to give meaning 
to the thing that they describe.  The MoD, for example, draw heavily on the 
idea of the countryside as functional space with specific human uses.  For 
the Council for National Parks, ideas of environmentalism were central.  The 
next chapter elaborates on these ideas by looking at the function of Otterburn 
and the strategies (material and discursive) deployed to establish specific 
uses. 
                                                 
6 He replied later that he had ‘made a point, since our last discussion, of looking for curlews, and you’ll be 
pleased to know I’ve seen many.’  (OPI, 10th July 1997) 
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CHAPTER 5 PRIORITISING USES 
 
In this chapter, I look at how the arguments about the function of the 
Otterburn Training Area were presented and contested. Although military 
training per se was generally accepted as a legitimate use for MoD land at 
Otterburn, the OPI of course was about something different: the impact of 
physical developments and of possible intensified or changed use of the 
training area.  All parties at the OPI produced arguments to support or refute 
the notion of impact and implicit within these arguments were statements 
about the use and function of the training area.  These arguments can be 
assessed in two ways.  First, we can see what is said, literally.  Second, we 
can inquire about the politics, ideologies and moralities bound up within 
such statements.  This chapter, then, looks at the statements made about the 
function of the OTA, with reference to the discourses - the systems of 
concepts, or frameworks of meanings - that all parties drew upon in order to 
argue their case.   
 
Historically, and as one would expect, the MoD has stressed the primary 
function of the OTA as a military training area.  Its 1990 Conservation 
Management Plan stated bluntly: 
The MoD holds its estate at Otterburn for one reason  -  to 
provide realistic training facilities for the Armed Forces.  It 
must be appreciated that, in view of the many other pressures 
upon the nation’s land resources, the areas available for 
military training are very restricted.  This inevitably means that 
those areas, such as OTA, which are designated military 
training grounds, must be used to the full, and developed to 
meet changing needs, in order to satisfy training requirements.  
 66
Therefore military training needs are of paramount importance 
in the management of the Otterburn estate.  (MoD, 1990, p.8) 
 
Similarly, a 1992 MoD Forestry Management Plan emphasised the priority 
given to training; Management Objective No.1 was ‘[T]o fulfil military 
training requirements and to enhance the training value of OTA.’  The 
protection of woodland with high habitat and landscape value and the 
provision of shelter for farms and military buildings came second and third 
(MoD, 1992).  A 1993 Strategic Estate Management Plan stated that ‘[T]he 
sole reason for MoD holding land is to provide training facilities’, and 
emphasised that ‘[T]he land holding of OTA is held by the MoD for one 
purpose only  -  to provide a realistic training facility for the Armed Forces’ 
(MoD, 1993, p.13, p.84).  Furthermore, the priority accorded to military 
training provided a justification for general development there: 
The military training requirement is the paramount concern in 
the management of OTA and it must be recognised that if the 
training area is to provide the facilities to train our modern 
Army to an acceptable standard, it can not be frozen in time, 
but must be allowed to develop to accommodate the changing 
requirements.  (MoD, 1993, p.84) 
 
The military function of the OTA has historically met with little opposition 
from parties contesting the MoD’s development plans.  For example, an 
early publicity leaflet published by the Council for the Protection of Rural 
England and other amenity organisations in response to initial discussion of 
the MoD’s plans stressed that ‘[T]his issue is not about pressing for military 
withdrawal from Otterburn’ (CPRE, undated).  Similarly, the thrust of the 
Northumberland County Council, the Northumberland National Park 
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Authority and the CNP Consortium’s arguments throughout the OPI was 
opposition to the proposed developments, but not to the military presence as 
such.  Dissent on the military’s right to use the OTA for training purposes 
came only from a few members of the public writing to the planning 
authority, and later to the Inspector: 
Father left the best years of his life in the Western Front, he 
was 31 years old when he got back home.  His 2 sons my eldest 
brothers were killed in bomber command.  Surely they didn’t 
die to create death for some-one else and to deprive our people 
of some lovely landscape.  (Letter to NPA, 30th July 1995) 
Such invasive military training is also a constant reminder of 
the very antagonism the public wishes to forget when it seeks 
spiritual refreshment within the Parks.  The sights and sounds 
associated with the theatre of war are distressing enough on the 
television.  To be aware of them in a supposed peaceful refuge, 
is to destroy all tranquility and well-being in the beholder.  
(Letter to Inspector, 24th April 1997) 
 
With the publication of the NoPD, and at the public inquiry itself, the MoD’s 
statements about the function of Otterburn shifted.  As we would expect, the 
primary purpose of the OTA as a military training area continued to be 
asserted, but in addition the range of supplementary functions was stressed.  
We can speculate as to the reasons for this shift.  It is possible that they lie 
with geopolitical changes which led to new developments in the structure 
and functions of the armed forces as defined in documents such as Options 
for Change, and Front Line First (MoD, 1991 and 1994).  It may well be the 
case that commentaries on military land use in National Parks, such as those 
contained in the Edwards report on the future of National Parks and the 
Countryside Commission’s examination of military training in 
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Northumberland were highly influential in shaping MoD policy statements 
on the compatibility of military training with other land uses (Edwards, 
1991; Countryside Commission, 1994).  It is also possible that the 
emergence of a critique of military training in protected landscapes from 
environmental groups in the light of a the so-called ‘peace dividend’ 
prompted the development of new public relations strategies for the 
portrayal of military training (Owens, 1990).  Whatever the reasons, I would 
argue that the MoD’s statements on the key function of Otterburn, developed 
at the OPI, placed very great emphasis on the compatibility of military 
training with other functions.  The OTA was still portrayed as having a 
military use, but emphasis on this land use was tempered with reference to 
additional functions.   
 
One example of this shift in statements about the function of Otterburn 
comes from the portrayal of farming and military training as compatible.  
Extensive grazing by sheep, it was argued, resulted in vegetation control, 
important in the impact areas on the ranges where live firing carries a fire 
risk through combustion of vegetation.  After all, ‘suspension of live firing 
to fight fires results in loss of valuable training time’ (MoD/P/2, p.5).  The 
‘beneficial co-existence of farming and military training’ (MoD/P/4, p.43) 
was supported by claims made for the utility of the proposed developments 
for agricultural as well as military purposes: 
The provision of additional hardstandings in the form of gun 
spurs will be of benefit in providing useful hard winter feeding 
stations for livestock.  This would help to minimise poaching 
that normally exists around feed stations and the manure and 
grass seed would assist in ‘greening-up’ and therefore 
obscuring the gun spurs from view.  (MoD/R/4/1, p.14) 
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These statements on the compatibility of military training with other 
activities can be viewed as material statements of fact.  They may also be 
viewed as discursive strategies.  If we do the latter, we pay attention not 
only to what is said, but also to the manner in which the statements are 
presented and the ideas implicit within these statements - the discourses 
upon which such statements draw.  The material and discursive content of 
statements about conservation, a second example of compatibility of 
function, provide considerable scope for analysis of material and discursive 
representations of purpose. 
 
Across the defence estate, the MoD stress the compatibility of military 
training with environmental protection through the deployment of a number 
of material strategies.  The Defence estate contains a unique natural heritage, 
of which the MoD is justifiably proud.  For example, there are over 200 Sites 
of Special Scientific Interest on the Defence estate (eleven of which are on 
the OTA).  Extensive areas of breckland, heathland and chalk grassland are 
preserved on the Stanford, Longmoor and Salisbury Plain Training Areas 
(MoD, 1995c).  A number of policy initiatives are directed towards the 
conservation of this natural heritage. For example, Declarations of Intent 
exist between the Ministry of Defence and English Nature (signed in 1996), 
the Countryside Council for Wales (1995) and Scottish Natural Heritage 
(1993) which establish that factors relating to nature conservation and 
natural heritage will be taken into account in the use and management of 
lands held by the MoD.  In 1987 the MoD signed a Declaration of 
Commitment to the National Parks and successive Statements on the 
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Defence Estimates for 1994, 1995 and 1996 stressed MoD compliance with 
national and European environmental legislation.  There are active 
conservation groups on most of the major training areas to advise on the 
environmental  
 
protection matters.  The Ministry of Defence presents initiatives such as 
these as evidence of a framework for the environmental protection of the 
defence estate (see Savege, 1997, for a fuller discussion). 
 
Material strategies for environmental protection are accompanied by 
discursive strategies which work towards the production of public image of 
military activity as compatible with environmental protection.  Discursive 
strategies - of ‘crater-as-habitat’, perhaps - consolidate this prioritisation of 
land uses on the defence estate.  These strategies work by making 
connections between conservation and military training, enabling the 
construction of training as environmentally beneficial (Woodward, 
forthcoming).  This is not a strategy unique to Otterburn, as Shields and 
Wright note with respect to Porton Down and the ranges in southern Dorset, 
respectively (Shields, 1996; Wright, 1996).  Nor, of course, is this strategy 
the sole preserve of the MoD.7  There is vigorous debate, of course, as to 
whether the rich natural heritage of the defence estate is the result of careful 
and deliberate stewardship on the part of the MoD, or the serendipitous 
outcome of a quite different set of land management policies.  The truth 
probably lies somewhere in between, but adjudicating on it is not my 
purpose here.  Rather, I am interested in the ways training, environment and 
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policy are linked at the discursive level.  The MoD talk confidently about the 
environmental benefits of military training activities, yet many remain 
highly sceptical (Westing, 1990; Seager, 1993; Thomas, 1995).  Given this 
scepticism, how does the representation of military environmentalism 
operate? 
 
One of the simplest ways in which this discursive strategy operated at the 
OPI was through the presentation of military training as a land management 
practice, rather than as a destructive pursuit: 
Military training activities themselves can be of benefit in 
conservation terms.  For example, many mires and blanket bog 
areas have been adversely affected by agricultural drainage in 
the past.  Drainage results in a loss of vegetation diversity and a 
reduction in insect populations.  Shell craters from artillery 
firing help to maintain waterlogged conditions and as the holes 
are gradually colonised, a diverse habitat is created which 
supports a varied insect population.  The availability of insects 
in spring is particularly important to the survival of chicks of 
many ground nesting bird species.  (MoD/P/4, pp.7-8) 
 
Military training - in this instance, the firing of shells resulting in the 
creation of craters-was presented as part of environmental stewardship.  The 
implication of this statement was that the creation of craters might help in 
the conservation of protected species such as the Black Grouse.  In another 
example, the limits placed on public access to certain areas because of live 
firing were promoted as a practice to reduce disturbance to wildlife: 
Military training, by its very nature, precludes public access 
during periods of dangerous training activities and to areas with 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 The US military deploys similar strategies to promote awareness of conservation activities on its training 
areas, to an often sceptical public (Dycus, 1996; Loomis, 1993; Boice, undated). 
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inherent dangers from unexploded ordnance.  However, the 
benefit of constraints to access is less disturbance to wildlife by 
the public and this is a positive factor in conserving the wildlife 
value of the Estate.  (MoD/P/4, p.8) 
 
When questioned by Counsel for the NCC/NNPA, the Senior Land Agent 
for the MoD at Otterburn provided further explanation as to why this should 
be: 
Q: The point here is that there is no evidence that constraints 
on public access are of benefit to Otterburn. 
 
A: There are no studies of ground nesting birds.  But studies 
for example show that birds don’t nest near footpaths.  
Generally there is no problem for the birds if public access is 
not allowed. 
 
Q: And would a bird distinguish between a rambler and a 
soldier? 
 
A: There’s a difference between using a path and military 
spread out across land.  They’re spread thinly and use different 
areas.  
(OPI, 28th May 1997) 
 
Any suggestion that the conservation benefits of military training were over-
stated was vigorously disputed by the MoD (MoD/R/7/1, pp.9-10).  The 
conservation argument was, after all, a key element in a strategy pursued by 
the MoD to maintaining public endorsement of military activity in Britain’s 
open landscapes, especially where those contain protected areas.  The 
Defence Estate Organisation has a dedicated Conservation Office, which 
publishes Sanctuary, a glossy magazine detailing the activities of 
conservation groups across the defence estate.  Its main message, on the 
compatibility of military training and environmental protection, is promoted 
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tirelessly; for example, photographs of compatible uses (stone curlews at 
Porton Down, barn owls in ammunition boxes) appear in the annual 
Statements of Defence Estimates for 1995 and 1996 (MoD, 1995e, 1996). 
 
A number of ideas feed into this discourse of training as land management.  
There is the notion of the soldier as an environmental guardian - a true eco-
warrior, perhaps.  Videos like ‘Train Green’ teach soldiers how to take 
account of environmental protection when training.  Implicit within such 
videos, through the use of text and images, is the idea of the soldier as 
steward of rural space.8  The notion of paternalism in land management is 
also evident here, where restrictive but well-meaning land management 
practices are followed, underpinned by a specific view of the landowner’s 
‘natural’ authority over territory. (Paternalism in land management is by no 
means the sole preserve of the MoD but an attribute shared by many large 
land owners; see Marsden  et al, 1993; Lowe and Ward, forthcoming.)  The 
third idea drawn upon in the presentation of the MoD’s environmental work 
is one about balance between sets of interests.  Two interests which might 
initially be perceived as irreconcilable - such as military training and 
environmental protection - are placed within a framework which allows for 
the possibility of compatibility between them.  These interests are both 
named as MoD policy objectives to be balanced in the pursuit of the ultimate 
goal, a trained army for defence of the realm.  The emphasis on balance 
frames the question in such a way as to make the attainment of this goal the 
outcome of the co-ordination of two equal things, rather than a contest 
                                                 
8 As I argue elsewhere, this video and other army publications promote particular notions of what it is to be 
a soldier in the countryside (Woodward, 1998).  For an alternative commentary on ‘Train Green’, see 
Coulson and Wright, 1995. 
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between two conceptually opposed objectives. This notion of balance, again, 
is not the sole preserve of the MoD, for Northumberland County Council 
raised it in the Inquiry too: 
[...] in relation to the current NoPD there are two public 
interests which must be reconciled.  That is the national public 
interests of the military and of National Parks.  Government 
policy does not state that either the defence interest or the 
National Park interest is paramount.  The County Council 
therefore wishes to see a balance struck between these two 
national interests and considers that the present proposal does 
not present such a balance.  (NCC/P/1, p.29) 
 
For much of the OPI, a balance could be struck; environmental protection 
could be promoted as mitigating the destructive potential of military training 
using heavy artillery systems.  For example, although peat bogs might be 
encroached upon by the new stone tracks at Watty Bell’s Cairn, management 
strategies elsewhere on the ranges would ensure the preservation of this 
valued habitat for breeding waders.   
 
However, one purpose in pursuing an interpretative methodology grounded 
in the analysis of discourses is to establish the point at which discourses 
collide or compete.  As developments within rural studies have shown, a 
focus on the interaction between opposing discourses can illuminate 
conflicts over rural land use.9  A good example of this competition between 
discourses appears in the exchange of views between the Natural History 
Society of Northumberland (a member of the CNP Consortium) and the 
MoD over the impact of the construction of the Tactical OP tracks on an area 
                                                 
9 Lowe et al (1997), for example, examine how farm pollution is constructed by two conflicting discourses 
of rurality. 
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of blanket mire between the Crow Stone and Watty Bell’s Cairn (the subject 
of a small dispute over its precise name and location mentioned in the 
discussion of local knowledge in the previous chapter).  Two very different 
discourses of conservation were discernible here.  One drew on the idea of 
statutory environmental protection as the determining factor in allowing 
development to go ahead.  The other took a looser, more inclusive stance 
towards protected habitats, resting ultimately on a moral arguments against 
interference in a protected habitat.  This exchange started with the argument 
put forward by the Natural History Society as to the damage that might be 
caused by the Tactical OP track: 
The new roads in this area will involve excavation of deep peat 
as can already be seen near Watty’s Cairn [...].  This will be 
followed by further and permanent erosion by weathering.  The 
peat in this area is part of a blanket mire.  Damage of this sort is 
unacceptable.  Blanket mire is a rare habitat worldwide of 
which 10-15% is in Great Britain.  It is a habitat listed (because 
of its importance) in Annex 1 of the Habitat and Wild Fauna 
and Flora Directive of the EU and is protected under UK 
legislation.  (NPC/P/5/1, p.5) 
 
The MoD countered this by arguing that the shortness of the track and the 
care taken in its construction would mitigate against environmental damage 
through drainage and erosion.  As to statutory protection: 
...the area of blanket mire at Watty Bell’s Cairn is a small 
outlier/extension of a larger area of blanket mire which extends 
away to the south east.  [...]  Blanket mire is listed in Annex 1 
of the EC Habitats Directive.  This does not mean that every 
area of blanket mire is protected under the provisions of the 
Directive.  Instead, the Directive requires that member states 
are to protect such habitats through the selection of Special 
Areas of Conservation (SACs) to form a coherent community 
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wide network called Natura 2000.  [...]  No part of Otterburn 
Training Area has been identified as a possible SAC by the 
Joint Nature Conservation Committee whose responsibility it is 
to identify candidate sites.  Although Site of Special Scientific 
Interest (SSSI) status was not a prerequisite of identification of 
SACs, as would be expected the majority of sites identified 
have already [been] notified as such.  Several mires at 
Otterburn are within SSSIs.  The blanket bog at Watty Bell’s 
Cairn does not form part of an SSSI.  Neither is it part of a non-
statutory site of Nature Conservation Importance (SNCI) [...]  
The small area of blanket bog which would be affected by the 
proposed new tracks does not therefore give rise to issues under 
either European or UK legislation or nature conservation 
policies.  (MoD/R/7/4, p.17) 
 
According to this line of argument, local specificity is unimportant; areas of 
bog are presented as interchangeable:  
Whilst this habitat cannot be replaced, the loss will be mitigated 
by improvements to moorland and bog habitats elsewhere 
through reductions in cattle and sheep grazing and restoration 
of hydrology.  [...]  These improvements would more than 
offset the minor loss of habitat at Watty Bell’s Cairn.  
(MoD/R/7/4, p.10) 
 
The terms in which the MoD argument for the construction of the Tactical 
OPs was made, of adherence to the strict parameters of environmental 
legislation, ran completely counter to those of the Natural History Society, 
who asserted the need for adherence to the spirit of environmental legislation 
within moral argument about the protection of valued habitats having 
priority over other issues.  In this example, a discourse of managerialism 
collided with a discourse of moral environmentalism. 
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Another point of interest for discourse analysts are the limits and points of 
rupture in a discourse.  Looking at this shows the boundaries of what that 
discourse claims to describe, and the limitations of the use of that discourse.  
In examining the MoD’s deployment of a discourse of military training as 
land management, it is pertinent to look for the point at which those claims 
about balance, stewardship and compatibility between conservation and 
training cease.  The example chosen here shows the limits to the various 
declarations binding the MoD to sound environmental practice. 
 
As discussed above, the MoD is party to a number of Declarations with 
statutory bodies which emphasise that it is MoD policy to uphold values 
leading to sound conservation practices.  These documents do not establish 
the primacy of environmental concerns, however.  The Declaration of Intent 
with English Nature, for example, states that: 
It is recognised that the primary purpose for which MoD holds 
or uses land is for military requirements and in the interest of 
national defence.   
 
It goes on: 
This Declaration of Intent does not interfere with these 
purposes but it is intended that full consultations with English 
Nature [...] shall ensure that nature conservation is taken 
properly into account thereafter, together with any other 
alternative uses or interests.   
 
Ultimately: 
It will aim to ensure the integration of environmental 
considerations into all policy areas having regard to the 
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desirability of promoting nature conservation wherever this is 
compatible with the needs of national defence.  (English Nature 
and MoD, 1996) 
 
The priority granted to military requirements echoes that within the MoD’s 
Declaration of Commitment to the National Parks, signed in September 
1987: 
In managing land which it owns or uses within the national 
parks, the MoD declares that it will endeavour to promote the 
objectives of the park authorities wherever these are compatible 
with the needs of national defence.  (MoD, 1987) 
 
The annual Statements of Defence Estimates say much the same.  For 
example: 
[The MoD] protects and enhances the natural environment in 
line with the Government’s environmental strategy, and the 
principles of stewardship and sustainability, within overriding 
operational and financial constraints.  (MoD, 1996b, p.102) 
 
Conservation, then, is important but not paramount; national security 
interests take precedence.  In theory, this means that if training is required 
which is environmentally destructive but essential for operational purposes, 
according to legislation and agreements with statutory bodies, the MoD is 
entitled to carry out such training in the interests of operational 
effectiveness.  Conservation is not an equal priority with military 
requirements. 
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The same principles that underpin these Declarations also underpin the 
mechanisms put forward by the MoD for conservation on the OTA; sound 
environmental conservation practices were to be followed, where they did 
not compromise military training requirements.  The CNP Consortium 
expressed in their closing statement to the OPI their reservations about the 
mechanisms which operationalise such commitments.  The Environmental 
Steering Group (ESG) to be established for the management of conservation 
practices on the OTA was welcomed in principle.  However, it was 
presented by the CNP Consortium as being an extension of the existing 
regime through which the Range Commandant as Chair of the ESG 
considered any conflicts.  The CNP Consortium argued that the existence of 
a mechanism for resolution provided no guidance as to how conflicts could 
be resolved: 
As to how this process will work in practice, the MoD’s 
position is straightforward: where there is a conflict which 
cannot be resolved through modification of the training pattern 
or other mechanisms, the need for military training will prevail.  
[...] in the present case, there is a very real likelihood of 
impacts, many of which could not be remediated while the 
MOD still met its training needs.  [...]  the ESG - with all the 
will in the world but faced always with the imperative of 
military training - will be compelled to sanction activities 
causing harm to the environment of OTA. (I/NPC/87, pp.25-26)    
 
According to this analysis, the primary function of the OTA would always 
remain military training.  Though symbolically constructed as compatible 
with other interests such as conservation, and framed within declarations as 
to sound environmental management practices, military needs would always 
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prevail.  The limits to the discourse of training as land management had been 
reached.   
 
Of course, there is nothing surprising about the MoD arguing for the prime 
function of Otterburn as a military training area.  Though presented with 
reference to notions of compatibility and balance with conservation 
objectives, the OTA is a military training area and, for the MoD, would 
always be used as such.  Hence the need for the developments set out in the 
NoPD.  The function of the OTA was argued on the basis of need, a national 
or public interest served by military training on that space.  That need was 
perhaps unassailable; certainly, the two main opposition groups appeared to 
face significant obstacles in the development of an oppositional strategy and 
argument when it came to this point.  As I pointed out above, at no point was 
the right of the MoD to conduct military training at the OTA disputed by the 
opposition groups.  Yet those parties were there to oppose the NoPD, a 
document framed within discourses of needs and the public interest in 
national security.  Unable or unwilling to dispute these claims, alternative 
interpretations of the function of Otterburn had to be presented.   
 
One avenue open for discussion of this issue was the interpretation of 
planning policy.  The calling letter for the OPI stated that one area for 
investigation by the Inspector would be the extent to which the development 
proposals conflicted with the advice in Planning Policy Guidance Note 7 
(PPG7), which provides guidance on land use planning in England’s rural 
areas.  It states in paragraph 4.5: 
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Special considerations apply to major development proposals, 
which are more national than local in character.  Major 
development should not take place in the National Parks, the 
Broads and the New Forest Heritage Area save in exceptional 
circumstances.  Because of the serious impact the major 
developments may have on these areas of natural beauty, 
applications for all such developments must be subject to the 
most rigorous examination.  Major developments should be 
demonstrated to be in the public interest before being allowed 
to proceed.  Consideration of such applications should therefore 
normally include an assessment of: 
(i)  the need for the development, in terms of national 
considerations, and the impact of permitting it or 
refusing it upon the local economy; 
(ii)   the cost of and scope for developing elsewhere outside 
the area or meeting the need for it in some other way; 
(iii)   any detrimental effect on the environment and the 
landscape and the extent to which that should be 
moderated.   
Any construction or restoration should be carried out to high 
environmental standards. 
 
PPG7 offered one route towards opposition, not through the deployment of 
arguments against militarism, but through the more positive strategy of 
arguments about the public interest.  The MoD’s statements about the 
unassailable need for the developments in the public interest were countered 
by NCC/NNPA and CNP Consortium arguments about the public interest 
served by refusing permission for further physical development on the 
training area.  The debates about PPG7 were also instructive for what they 
indicated about the political contexts informing the strategies of each party. 
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We can begin by looking at the way PPG7 was framed by each party.  
Needless to say, there was little agreement between the three.  The Assistant 
County Planning and Environment Manager for the Northumberland County 
Council stated that ‘[T]he guidance note provides advice on major 
developments in National Parks’ (NCC/P/1, p.24).  The MoD’s planning 
consultant argued in his Proof of Evidence that ‘paragraph 4.5 sets out the 
circumstances in which major developments can occur’ (MoD/P/12, p.11). 
The CNP Consortium provided an alternative interpretation, stating that 
PPG7 ‘provides for a strong presumption against major development in 
National Parks’ (NPC/P/1, p.35). 
 
Each party then went on to explain how its interpretation of need supported a 
particular interpretation of PPG7.  For the MoD, PPG7 required that any 
major development should include an assessment of need in terms of 
national considerations.  This assessment was given in descriptions of the 
‘important role played by AS90 and MLRS regiments in the new 
international security environment’ (MoD/P/12, p. 12).  Given that there 
were no alternatives to training using live firing and no alternative locations 
for this training other than the OTA, the conclusion was that ‘the Artillery’s 
effectiveness and capability would be significantly compromised if the 
proposals did not go ahead’.  Need in this scenario was interpreted as a 
military one.  PPG7 was presented as essentially permissive if a public 
interest or need could be established.  ‘There is acknowledgement that major 
development in the National Parks can be in the public interest.  [...]  PPG7 
therefore recognises that major developments may be in the public interest’ 
(MoD, 1997, p.37).   
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What was this public interest?  The MoD’s Statement of Case outlines over 
two pages the ‘urgent, national need for AS90 and MLRS to train for 
operational deployment including live firing’: 
The artillery system is complex and requires considerable 
training if its potential as a key battle winning component is to 
be realised and the safety of troops maintained.  The artillery is 
utilised across the spectrum of conflicts, but must 
fundamentally train for high intensity conflict.  (MoD, 1997, 
p.38) 
 
There was a need for troops to practice using sophisticated weaponry, which 
as well as giving soldiers basic competence to use their equipment would 
also bring them confidence, build an esprit de corps, demonstrate the 
effectiveness of command procedures, show that the equipment would work 
and test soldiers under difficult conditions.   
Lack of proper training on a live firing range denies soldiers 
these advantages and means that the artillery will not be 
prepared or capable of carrying out the tasks laid upon it by the 
Government.  Lack of confidence, inexperience, distrust of 
equipment and concern about the ability of others leads to 
uncertainty, ineffectiveness, unnecessary casualties and defeat.  
The discipline and determination required to succeed in war are 
bred on the training ground.  (MoD, 1997, pp.38-9) 
 
Ultimately the need for soldiers to train was required by the armed forces’ 
obligations to meet certain states of readiness for deployment.  These were 
set out at length with detailed descriptions of the UK armed forces’ 
involvement in NATO’s Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps 
(ARRC) and the UK’s Joint Rapid Deployment Forces (JRDF) (MoD/P/1).  
 84
Failure to reach readiness states required by regiments contributing to ARRC 
and JRDF would lead to a reduction in operational effectiveness, surely a 
public interest.  Furthermore, given the lack of existing facilities to train with 
AS90 and MLRS, current commitments were not being reached.  The need 
was also therefore a pressing one.  In short, Otterburn’s function was defined 
in terms of the public interest in having a trained, proficient artillery.  PPG7 
was interpreted as permitting development to serve interests such as these. 
 
The CNP Consortium offered an alternative interpretation of PPG7 and the 
issue of need and the public interest.  Its representatives argued that PPG7 
should be placed in the context of the history of attitudes towards major 
development in National Parks.  This history was presented as hingeing on 
the so-called ‘Silkin Test’10, whereby need had to be demonstrated to be 
absolutely in the public interest, with no possible alternatives.  The Council 
for National Parks’ Proof of Evidence went into substantial detail to show 
how successive governments had upheld the principle that National Park 
designation conferred the highest possible status of protection, with 
development proposals being subject to the highest possible level of 
scrutiny.  It argued in its main Proof of Evidence that PPG7 had to be 
interpreted within this historical context. 
The key questions under PPG7 are whether the nation’s need 
for military training with the AS90 and the MLRS in the 
Northumberland National Park in the way proposed has been 
demonstrated.  The burden of proof rests with the developer.  
Has it further been demonstrated that there are no alternative 
sites available anywhere at all?  And can the need, if proven, be 
met in any other way?  Only if those criteria are satisfied should 
                                                 
10 Named after a former Town and Country Planning Minister, Lewis Silkin. 
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consideration take place of the environmental impacts and any 
mitigation necessary.  (NPC/P/1, pp.35-6) 
 
According to the Council for National Parks, the requirements of PPG7 had 
not been met.  A considerable amount of time was taken up in the cross-
examination of MoD witnesses in order to establish this (with a great deal of 
additional information appearing at the Inquiry which for some participants 
pointed to the paucity of information kept by the MoD about their activities 
on training lands).  For example, the Council for National Parks argued that 
a single geographical solution had been sought to the problem of training 
with MLRS and AS90.  The assessment of overseas training options had 
been dismissed too quickly.  The environmental impacts of the scheme had 
not been properly assessed from the outset.  The Council for National Parks’ 
Proof of Evidence on this issue concluded that: 
The MoD has not demonstrated that it has carried out the 
rigorous examination required by PPG7, which contains a 
strong presumption against major development in National 
Parks.  The MoD has not demonstrated that the need to develop 
in the OTA is sufficient to over-ride the public interest in 
National Parks.  Its internal decision-making process has 
handicapped it from examining fully the alternatives.  The 
rigorous examination of need and alternatives required by 
PPG7 is further compromised by the MoD tying the two 
weapons systems together, when the training requirements are 
different.  The application further fails the PPG7 test by not 
proposing measures that would adequately mitigate the impacts 
of the major development in such a sensitive area.  (NPC/P/1, p. 
48) 
 
The MoD produced two counter-arguments to these assertions.  The first was 
to argue against the idea of a ‘Silkin Test’ incorporated in the assessments to 
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be made in PPG7.  ‘They do not require development to be demonstrated to 
be ‘absolutely’ necessary in the public interest’ (MoD/R/12/4, p.18).  The 
planning consultant went on to cite an inquiry into a proposed holiday 
village in Kent, where the Inspector had argued that the Silkin Test did not 
appear in PPG7, and that the correct interpretation of PPG7 should be on 
‘what is explicitly stated’.  Accordingly, the MoD argued that PPG7 
contained clear guidance ‘that major development proposals which are 
national in character can go ahead in National Parks’ provided, of course, 
that they were examined rigorously, were demonstrably in the public interest 
and properly assessed.  For the opposition, this was insufficient; PPG7 
contained a significant presumption against major development in a National 
Park: 
The long tradition of National Park policy from the Dower 
report up to the recent Parliamentary debates on the 
Environment Act make it absolutely clear that this substantial 
presumption exists precisely because the National Park 
designation is afforded the highest status of protection for 
landscape and scenic beauty.   
To overcome that presumption, it must be shown that 
“exceptional circumstances” prevail.  It is not enough, as Mr 
Joyce [the Planning consultant] seeks to do, to assert that 
anything which overcomes the “needs and alternatives” test [...] 
rebuts the presumption and becomes, by definition, 
“exceptional”.   
We say that the test goes one stage further; and that the absence 
of a definition of “exceptional circumstances” is unsurprising 
because, by their very nature, such circumstances cannot be 
foreseen or described until they arise.  Certainly, we say, that a 
development such as this  - which Colonel Cross [Range 
Officer, OTA] described as reflecting the “normal rhythm and 
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pattern of use at a major training area” - cannot be considered 
exceptional.  (I/NPC/87, pp.10-11) 
 
The Northumberland County Council pursued a different line of argument, 
instead arguing that the developments were highly exceptional.  Other 
considerations, as well as those explicitly stated in PPG7, should also be 
taken into account: 
The PPG7 examples of considerations are directed to deal with 
the usual situation of individual site specific development 
proposals such as a quarry or a windfarm rather than a proposal 
such as this NoPD which is spread over a wide geographical 
area with consequences which have a wider impact including 
noise, vehicle movements and further increases in the live firing 
area from which the public is excluded periodically.  (NPC/P/1, 
p.24) 
 
For Northumberland County Council, it was the unusual nature of this 
development that affected the way the NoPD should be interpreted within 
the provisions of planning policy guidance.  PPG7 states that major 
developments should be demonstrated to be in the public interest, and that 
consideration of applications should normally include an assessment of the 
need for a development and alternatives to it.  For the County Council’s 
witness on planning matters, 
I take PPG7 and conclude that it includes the word ‘include’.  
Because of the unusual nature of the NoPD, and the abnormal 
consequences, it is relevant to look at other matters.  This is 
allowed for by the word “include” in 4.5.  (OPI, 13th June 
1997) 
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For NCC/NNPA, other matters included, for example, the question as to 
whether the development would have a net adverse effect on the landscape.  
The witness on planning matters was questioned closely on this issue by 
Counsel for the MoD: 
 
Q: Where does it say that if there’s a net adverse effect, this 
should lead to a refusal? 
A: It doesn’t say that if there’s a net adverse effect, then 
there must be refusal.  But clearly a net adverse effect in 
a National Park must weigh heavily.  It’s my 
interpretation of guidance.   
Q:   So it doesn’t say ‘no net intensification of activity’. 
A:  Doesn’t say that. 
(OPI 13th June 1997) 
 
This interchange illustrates two opposing interpretations quite clearly, with 
the MoD Counsel arguing that PPG7 should be interpreted literally, versus a 
local authority arguing that guidance such as PPG7 is there for 
interpretation.   
 
Furthermore for the NCC/NNPA as local planning authority, the need for the 
development had to be proven, rather than taken merely as a statement of 
fact.  One argument made was that in the absence of an independent national 
review of army training requirements, the principle of need for the 
development had not been demonstrated (NCC/P/1, p.28), an argument also 
made by the Council for National Parks, the UK Centre for Environmental 
and Economic Development, the Countryside Commission, the National 
Parks Review Panel and the House of Commons Defence Committee 
(NPC/P/1, p.38).  The issue of a review of training needs was one the MoD 
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was very reluctant to bring in to the debate on the needs for the Otterburn 
developments: 
There is no suggestion in PPG7 that the assessment of whether 
there is a need for a proposed development which it is in the 
public interest to meet should require an independent national 
review of requirements.  There is a difference between 
assessing whether there is a need for a proposed development 
which it is in the public interest to meet, i.e. carrying out a 
PPG7 assessment, and a national review of the nations needs.  
(MoD/R/12/1, p.22) 
 
The question of proof of need was a fundamental one.  The MoD was also 
faced with a considerable amount of cross-examination from the 
NCC/NNPA and CNP Consortium who tried to demonstrate that the MoD 
had not shown sufficient proof that there was a recognised need for the 
development and an absence of alternatives.  For the MoD, the sheer weight 
and detail of its evidence to the OPI was demonstration enough of proven 
needs and a lack of alternatives.  The MoD’s planning consultant referred 
twice to the ‘considerable volume of material’ available, such as the NoPD 
and supporting documentation, the core documents, proofs of evidence and 
supporting information, additional documentation submitted to the Inquiry, 
evidence given in cross-examination and rebuttal proofs of evidence, stating 
that: 
[...] there is no reason why the Secretary of State cannot 
properly assess the NoPD proposals on the basis of this 
substantial volume of information. 
This considerable volume of material is more than enough to 
enable the assessments set out in PPG7 to be made.  
(MoD/R/12/1, p.23; MoD/R/12/4, p.19) 
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Not so, said the CNP Consortium in their concluding statement.  The 
rigorous examination of the issues required by PPG7 had not been met.  The 
quality of information presented by the MoD was inadequate, not least 
because, for the CNP Consortium, the MoD had been less than helpful in 
supplying relevant information. 
We [...] have been left to play something of a ‘cat and mouse’ 
game with the Ministry of Defence in order to obtain 
information upon which to assess the MoD’s arguments.  This 
has not been the usual Inquiry scenario where (at least in 
theory) all the parties have access to all the information.  Here, 
the MOD has taken advantage of its special position and has 
kept its information close to its chest.  The process of 
“clarification questions” has helped [...] but one needs to know 
what questions to ask.  And while the MOD has (generally) 
answered the actual questions asked, its answers have rarely 
enabled a proper assessment of the correctness of its overall 
assertions.  (I/NPC/87, p. 12) 
 
An example was given to substantiate the CNP Consortium’s argument that 
the need for the development had not been proven because of inadequate 
information: 
[...] in making its case that its training lands are fully utilised, 
the MOD placed great reliance on the Land Reconciliation 
Study [an internal MoD review of military training land 
requirements].  You will recall that we sought access to that 
study from an early pre-inquiry meeting.  It has been 
consistently refused.  Thus, through cross-examination we 
probed the analysis which was undertaken in the Land 
Reconciliation Study.  In doing so, we had to make various 
assumptions because the Study was not available.  In reply, 
Colonel Carter told us our assumptions were wrong and that, on 
proper information, our conclusions were therefore flawed.  He 
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provided more, but still partial, information.  We therefore took 
the exercise one stage further based upon this new information.  
He then informed us that we had made yet more incorrect 
assumptions and gave us yet more partial information.  That 
process could have gone on forever, but time ran out.  The 
exchange shows that, because of the approach adopted by the 
MOD, it has not been possible to subject the MOD’s case to the 
“rigorous examination” required by PPG7.  It certainly cannot 
be claimed, on the basis of the information before the Inquiry, 
that the Land Reconciliation Study supports the case on ‘need’ 
that the MoD has presented.  (I/NPC/87, p.12, emphases in 
original) 
 
Counsel for the Northumberland County Council and National Park 
Authority raised a similar objection to MoD claims to have met the 
provisions of PPG7, claiming that they had neither the resources or 
‘sufficient access to relevant information and documents to subject the 
project to the scrutiny to which a civil project would be exposed’ (I/NCC/ 
p.34).  According to the NCC/NNPA, the MoD team had placed much 
reliance on material peculiarly within their own knowledge, such as 
classified documents and much, therefore, depended upon the amount of 
trust in the reliability of MoD statements to the Inquiry.  The NCC/NNPA 
went on to claim that MoD statements were ‘seriously misleading on 
important matters’ with, for example, a failure to produce references to 
important pages and paragraphs supporting major parts of the MoD’s case.  
This: 
strongly indicates that the MoD case is based upon an 
interpretation of the classified documents rather than upon any 
clear statement within them which supports the MoD’s case.  
(I/NCC/36, p.35) 
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In conclusion, in opposing the development proposals, the two main 
opposition groups faced a peculiar difficulty.  They did not (and perhaps 
could not) oppose the principle of the use of the OTA for military training, 
but did oppose the idea of further development and possible intensification 
of that military use.  Direct confrontation on the function of Otterburn was 
avoided; and although other functions (primarily recreational) were 
promoted, the central purpose of the OTA remained beyond dispute.  A more 
oblique oppositional strategy was therefore required.  In this, the question of 
the need for the developments became central, with the NCC/NNPA and the 
CNP Consortium both attempting to undermine the MoD’s argument by 
pointing to the proof of need required by Planning Policy Guidance, and 
arguing that need for artillery training of the type proposed had not been 
sufficiently demonstrated.  In this argument, public interest in this case was 
defined as the need for protection of landscapes with high levels of statutory 
protection.  This countered MoD arguments that it served the public interest 
both through the provision of training for national security needs, and 
through the protection of landscapes and the environment through 
compatible conservation practices.  In the following and concluding chapter, 
I look at this how discourses of national security operated at the OPI, 
consolidating the MoD’s case and shaping the ways in which oppositional 
arguments were developed in response. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
In this concluding chapter, I draw together some of the arguments presented 
during the examination of the empirical material to argue that a reading of 
the discourses which informed the portrayal of Otterburn can be understood 
with reference to a powerful discourse of national security and military 
capacity which ultimately underpinned the whole Otterburn debate.  I argue 
that this warrants discussion because of its power in shaping the arguments 
for the development, or otherwise, of the OTA for artillery training. 
 
As I stated in the introduction, this report is not an adjudication of the rights 
or wrongs of any one case put forward at the OPI.  This would be a 
fascinating and weighty matter for research.  The skill, knowledge and 
expertise available to each party at the Inquiry produced an enormous 
amount of documentation and supporting oral evidence on a range of 
arguments, such as whether Salisbury Plain Training Area really could be 
used for MLRS training, the extent to which military training activities did 
or did not impinge upon access to the OTA and its wider area by walkers, 
and whether or not the M28 rockets used in training with the MLRS 
produced a toxic efflux which would endanger people and wildlife in the 
vicinity of its firing position.  These and other arguments were debated in 
order to establish one way or another their validity and the veracity and 
accuracy of the data used in their support.  Needless to say, at the close of 
the Inquiry, all the participants and observers seemed united in the view that 
none of us envied the Inspector his task of mediating between these 
competing claims. The intention of doing likewise was not my purpose in 
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attending the Inquiry.  Rather, the research was prompted by my interest in 
the ways in which the arguments between competing land uses were 
constructed, the portrayals of place, space and landscape which such 
arguments produced, the origins of such portrayals and ultimately the 
political purposes which they served. The rich cultural geography and rural 
studies literature on the shape and purpose of constructions of place, space 
and landscape provided a theoretical framework for the exploration of the 
complex material emanating from the OPI. 
 
This report presents the results of that study, and views the OPI as an 
example of a contest between competing portrayals of space and place by 
different organisations to different ends.  The methodology used is an 
interpretative one assessing the purpose of arguments as opposed to a more 
positivistic assessment of their validity.  The intention of an interpretative 
methodology is to tease out the form and function of portrayals and the 
arguments which produced them, assess their power as discursive 
constructions and examine how such discourses operate.  This is what I have 
done with the material on Otterburn.   
 
In Chapter 3, I examined the way in which different historical narratives 
contributed to discourses which supported competing interpretations of the 
function of Otterburn.  For the MoD, the portrayal of OTA as a military 
training area was rooted in a narrative which presented the Otterburn area 
historically as a military location.  For the CNP Consortium, a different 
history emphasising the multiple uses of this land and their remaining 
imprint contributed towards a moral discourse which portrayed land as a 
 95
universal, shared resource in which no activity, human or otherwise, should 
ultimately take precedence.  For the NCC/NNPA, a more pragmatic 
discourse of land management informed a history which stressed the needs 
for mediation between competing land use claims.   
 
In Chapter 4, I went on to look at how each main party at the Inquiry 
portrayed the landscape of the OTA.  A functionalist discourse drawn upon 
by the MoD emphasised a pragmatic approach to the description of a 
(military) landscape.  This was countered by portrayals by the CNP 
Consortium which emphasised the scarcity of such relict landscapes and the 
moral imperative for their protection, a line of argument pursued in 
NCC/NNPA evidence as well.   
 
In Chapter 5, I examined how these portrayals were underpinned by 
arguments on the use and function of Otterburn, where managerialist and 
environmentalist discourses collided.  I then went on to discuss the strategies 
used by the two main opposition parties to provide arguments drawing on 
discourses of public interest, and suggested that this was a strategy to 
counter seemingly unassailable claims by the MoD on their right to use the 
OTA for military training.   
 
This report, then, represents the OPI as a struggle between competing 
discourses, where different frameworks for the interpretation of social life 
intersect and conflict during a debate about the future of a particular place.  I 
could just leave it at that, were it not for the point that the significant issue in 
the study of the discursive nature of social life is the ways in which different 
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discourses support particular political interests and the configuration of 
certain sets of social relations, at the expense of others (Pratt, 1996).  A 
complete exposition or ‘archaeology’ of  the discourses abounding at the 
OPI is beyond the scope of the research reported here.  However, in the 
remainder of this chapter I explore one area where further investigation 
would be warranted by suggesting that a powerful and widely-shared 
discourse about military capacity informs both the structure of the OPI 
arguments outlined here and the wider political context in which the future 
of the OTA will be ultimately decided.   
 
At the heart of the OPI sat a silence.  War was rarely referred to.  When 
references were made to the primary purpose of the AS90 and MLRS they 
seemed rather shocking, and perhaps brutally out of place in the pastel 
shades of the Wansbeck suite of the Moat House Hotel where the OPI took 
place.  One of the most startling examples came from the evidence to the 
Inquiry of Bill Short, a local resident arguing against the developments on 
the grounds that the toxicity and noise levels of the MLRS practice rocket 
had not been fully assessed.  In making his case, he showed a manufacturer’s 
video of the MLRS in action.  The video, entitled MLRS: The Force 
Multiplier, left observers in little doubt as to the destructive potential of this 
artillery system (OPI, 7th October 1997).  It was one of the few reminders as 
to why we were all there in the first place. 
 
One reason for this silence lies with the nature of the inquiry process.  Public 
inquiries are perhaps not necessarily occasions for the discussion of 
environmental policy issues because of the constraints of the structure of 
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such encounters, with their emphasis on local practicalities, their adversarial 
nature and the costs of participation (Rydin, 1993).  And as Doxford and 
Savege have argued with reference to Otterburn, a public inquiry would 
offer an inappropriate framework for the discussion of the two core issues, 
the MoD’s allocation and use of training lands, and the role of the MoD 
within National Parks (Doxford and Savege, 1995).  However, as I have 
argued in this report, in many ways the OPI was of great significance.  One 
of these points of significance concerns the conclusions we can draw on our 
attitudes to warfare and militarism from the debate over the future of the 
Otterburn Training Area.  It is to this which I now turn. 
 
The silence about war and violence was perhaps the outcome of the ways in 
which the debate was framed by the Ministry of Defence.  In his opening 
statement, Counsel for the MoD began by removing the issue of the need for 
the developments from the scope of debate.  After describing the 
characteristics of the AS90 and MLRS (‘they are formidable weapons’) he 
went on to argue for the need to train soldiers in their use: 
We do not expect anyone to deny this nor do we expect it to 
become an issue, because failure to be properly trained in the 
use of these weapons means greater difficulties in succeeding in 
military conflict objectives and more casualties.  The proposals 
now being put forward, for consideration at this Inquiry, are to 
enable those who use, and will use, these weapons to be fully 
and properly trained with the weapons and to be at required 
readiness states.  So we say that the development proposals are 
of the highest national importance and self evidently in the 
public interest.  I say that this is beyond argument.  (I/MoD/1, 
p.2) 
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One response to this statement could be that ‘they would say that, wouldn’t 
they?’, and to leave it at that.  But a discussion of this discursive silence 
about warfare and militarism is crucial, because it points to the power of one 
particular discourse which underpins the portrayals of place and space that 
have been discussed here. 
 
The work of Martin Shaw on the relationships between military institutions, 
military culture and social relations, is helpful here (Shaw, 1991).  As part of 
a wider analysis of what he terms ‘post-military society’, Shaw describes 
militarism in contemporary British culture in terms of a ‘national military 
myth’.  The central tenets of this are an ideology and imagery of totalitarian 
threat; a belief that appeasement of such threats is morally wrong; and the 
notion that military strength is the foundation of national security (Shaw, 
1991).  These ideas, he argues, constitute a sustaining myth about British 
defence and military activity, a myth in the sense of an explanatory narrative 
embodying popular ideas about social phenomena, rather than as a fictional 
story.  This myth about British militarism, Shaw argues, is central to ideas 
about defence and security needs, and is a central feature of the political 
culture (in which the MoD, as a state institution, is central).  He argues that 
this national military myth also contributes to an ideology and discourse 
about military matters which is both resilient to removal and adaptable to 
change (p.119).   
 
The tenets of Shaw’s national military myth were identifiable at the OPI on 
the rare occasions that issues of military capacity and ability were raised.  
For example, the notion of military strength as the basis for national security 
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was used to refute arguments that the need for the NoPD developments had 
not been demonstrated: 
The goal of British security policy is to maintain the freedom 
and territorial integrity of the United Kingdom and its 
dependent territories, and the ability to pursue its legitimate 
interests at home and abroad.  Key to this is deterrence which 
depends not only upon the perception of the nation’s political 
will to respond to a threat, but on other factors, including forces 
which are perceived to be effective and capable of preventing a 
potential adversary from achieving his strategic objectives.  To 
be perceived to have a highly trained, well motivated and 
operationally ready army is an important part of that deterrence.  
(I/MoD/107) 
 
The resilience and adaptability of this national military myth is also 
applicable.  An example might be the shifts in the portrayal of the function 
of Otterburn to include discourses of conservation, as discussed in Chapter 
5.   
 
A key point about this national military myth is its salience.  This may be 
contentious, but I would argue that the majority of the participants at the 
Inquiry shared very similar views on the role of the military national security 
policies.  For although some used language to emphasise a different world-
view to the MoD11 in fact the official statements from the two main 
opposition groups tended to endorse the idea that national security and 
defence needs, expressed through military strength, were unassailable.  For 
example, in their closing statements, Counsels for the NCC/NNPA and CNP 
Consortium respectively, took pains to express their clients’ support for the 
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work of the armed forces (I/NCC/36, I/NPC/87).  Individual witnesses, when 
questioned on the need for a trained army, mostly agreed on its importance.  
Opposition to the very issue of the militarisation of the countryside was, for 
the most part, absent. 
 
My argument is that Shaw’s ‘national military myth’ is a powerful discourse.  
It is a discourse in that it can be interpreted as a system of concepts which 
gives meanings to the social world, in this instance the role of the armed 
forces and the priorities we give them in our society.  It is powerful for the 
following reasons.  It is of fundamental importance at Otterburn because it 
shaped the ways in which the history, form and function of that place were 
expressed, by its owners, and the ways in which alternative views were 
expressed by other social groups (the local authority, or amenity societies).  
It is powerful because it was difficult to overturn, so much so that at the OPI 
opponents of the scheme did not attempt to do so.  It is powerful because it 
shifted Otterburn from being a corner of remote, windswept Northumberland 
to being a central element in the UK’s national security strategy.  It is 
powerful in that it shaped the discourses which provided support for the 
arguments discussed in this paper on, for example, the environmentally 
benign nature of military training (see also Woodward, forthcoming), or on 
the minimal visual impact of the NoPD developments on human visitors, 
constructed with reference to this discourse as a price worth paying in the 
pursuit of military security goals.  And ultimately it is powerful because it 
will undoubtedly influence the decision of the Secretary of State for 
Transport, Environment and the Regions to permit the developments, a 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 Counsel for the NCC/NNPA started his questions in clarification to the MoD by talking of ‘Ohtah’and 
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decision which at the time of writing has yet to be made.  We are so wrapped 
up in the notion of the unassailable importance of military strength that the 
case to allow the developments to proceed appears unanswerable.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘Mewlars’ rather than OTA and MLRS; a deliberate slip of the tongue?  (OPI, 22nd April 1997) 
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APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY 
 
This commentary on the OPI stands not only as a contribution to the debate 
on military training in National Parks but also as a contribution to current 
debates about the social construction of rural space, and the methodologies 
most suited to such inquiry.  Recent debates on the social construction of 
rurality have stressed the insights that can be drawn through the use of 
interpretative methodologies which focus on the operation of discourses in 
the construction of social activity (Halfacree, 1993; Murdoch and Pratt, 
1993, 1994).  These debates also stress that such an approach should 
properly focus on the operation of power and its effects on social relations.  
Thus, it is insufficient, for example, to merely describe the features of a set 
of statements (a discourse) about something (such as military training in 
rural areas); the power relations which operate through the deployment of 
discourses are also a legitimate focus (Pratt, 1996).  The analysis of 
discourses requires close attention to language, for it is through language 
that ideas are expressed and conveyed.   
 
This report is not an adjudication of the rights or wrongs of any particular 
case presented at the public inquiry.  Nor do I attempt to promote any 
particular views as to whether the developments should proceed or not as 
more valid than others.  What I have set out to do is to illustrate the 
arguments made by the main parties at the OPI, and to show how the claims 
of one side were countered by another, reconstructing the dialogue between 
the various parties.  This reconstructed dialogue is not recorded 
chronologically; some of the arguments discussed in this report took place 
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over a period of months.  The intention has been to show how they unfold, 
and to indicate their nature, rather than to present a blow-by-blow account of 
debates.  Mostly, I have reconstructed these dialogues with reference to the 
documentation presented at the Inquiry (proofs of evidence, rebuttal 
evidence, Inquiry documents and core documents).  I have also drawn 
heavily, in the interpretation of this evidence, from the questions of 
clarification put to witnesses, and their cross-examination.  Where I use oral 
evidence in this report, through a literal reconstruction of dialogue, I have 
tried to be as accurate as my hand-written notes will allow (as I did not tape-
record the proceedings). 
 
A public inquiry over six months inevitably generated a vast amount of 
information.  I have been extremely selective here in the topics chosen for 
discussion, and would not wish to give the impression that debates over the 
history, landscape and use of the OTA were the only issues.  Topics 
discussed at the Inquiry and not dealt with here include: the provision of 
alternative training facilities for MLRS and AS90 at Salisbury Plan and 
Sennybridge Training Areas and at BATUS (Canada); noise and vibration 
from shell and rocket firing; moderation of adverse effects of the 
development; access and rights-of-way; transportation of convoys of 
artillery and the effect on highways; MLRS toxicity and pollution; 
procedures for Environmental Impact Assessments; tranquillity mapping.  
Any apparent emphasis in this report on the MoD case is a reflection of the 
procedure of public inquiries, where the developer presents the case and thus 
sets the agenda for debate, and also a reflection of the far greater amount of 
documentation produced by the MoD than other parties at the Inquiry. 
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The view from where I sat at the back of the Inquiry room was a peculiar 
one.  I saw the faces of those giving evidence, and the backs of everyone 
else.  I am not sure whether this is a metaphor for my involvement at the 
Inquiry.  I neither sought, nor was granted, involvement with any of the 
parties at the Inquiry, and this account is partial in that respect.  Because I 
did not have privileged inside information on the production of the 
arguments put forward at the Inquiry, there are obviously limits to the claims 
I can make about their purposes.  I make this point to stress that this report is 
a critical interpretation of the debate over the OTA, rather than a definitive 
statement on the rights or wrongs of any one case. 
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APPENDIX B: PRINCIPAL WITNESSES TO THE OTTERBURN 
PUBLIC INQUIRY 
 
For the Ministry of Defence 
Counsel for MoD: Nigel McLeod QC, with C Katkowski and L McDonald 
Lt Col J Carter (UK army training requirements: MoD/P/1) 
Lt Col J Bleasdale (AS90 and MLRS Training Requirements: MoD/P/2) 
Mr K Trew (RPS Clouston) (Landscape and visual impact: MoD/P/3)) 
Mr R Manners (Defence Estate Organisation) (Estate management: 
MoD/P/4) 
Lt Col (Rtd) R Cross (The level and pattern of training at Otterburn: 
MoD/P/5) 
Mr R Evans (RPS Clouston) (Moderation of adverse effects: MoD/P/6) 
Dr K Jones (RPS Clouston) (Nature conservation: MoD/P/7) 
Mr D Freke (RPS Clouston) (Cultural heritage: MoD/P/8) 
Mr P Harney (White Young Consulting Group) (Highways and engineering: 
MoD/P/9) 
Mr G Parry (RPS Clouston) (Noise and vibration: MoD/P/10) 
Mr P Smith (Frank Graham and Partners) (Salisbury Plain Training Area: 
MoD/P/11) 
Mr R Joyce (Drivers Jonas) (Planning: MoD/P/12) 
Dr I Vince (AGEL-CBI) (Modelling of M28 Rocket efflux dispersion: 
MoD/R/13/8) 
Prof J Bridges (University of Surrey) (M28 rocket efflux products: 
MoD/R/14/8) 
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Also inquiry documents I/MoD/1 - 294 
 
A number of rebuttal proofs were also produced by the above witnesses, 
dealing with the points raised by the witnesses below. 
 
 
For the Northumberland County Council and National Park Authority 
Counsel for NCC/NPA: Robert McCracken 
Mr G Halliday (Assistant County Planning and Environment Manager, 
Northumberland County Council) (Planning and related issues: 
NCC/P/1)  
Mr T Carroll (Deputy National Park Officer, Northumberland National Park 
Authority) (National Park and related issues: NCC/P/2) 
Mr M Forsdyke (AcousticAir) (Noise and Vibration: NCC/P/3) 
Mr H Collis (Ove Arup and Partners) (Highways: NCC/P/4) 
 
Also inquiry documents I/NCC/1 - 37 
 
 
For the Council for National Parks Consortium 
Ms V Elcoate (Council for National Parks) (National Parks and related 
issues: NPC/P/1 and supplements) 
Dr A Lunn (Council for National Parks) (National parks and environmental 
issues: NPC/P/1a and supplements) 
Mr T Pollard (Ramblers’ Association) (Access and related issues: NPC/P/2) 
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Mr G Coggins (Northumberland and Newcastle Society) (Environmental 
impact, mitigation and related issues: NPC/P/3) 
Dr D Gardner-Medwin (Natural History Society of Northumbria) 
(Environmental impact, conservation and related issues: NPC/P/5 and 
supplements) 
Mr T Hardy (Association of Voluntary Countryside Wardens) (Access and 
related issues: NPC/P/6) 
Dr K Ashby (Youth Hostels Association (Access and related issues: 
NPC/P/7) 
Mr W Sheate (for Council for the Protection of Rural England) 
(Environmental impact assessment, decision-making process and 
related issues: NPC/P/8) 
Mr J Lewis (CPRE Northumberland Branch) (environmental impact and 
related issues: NPC/P/9) 
 
Also inquiry documents I/NPC/1 - 87 
 
 
For the Northumberland County Lifeline Group 
Mr W Short  on MLRS toxicity, noise and vibration. 
Mr J Carter  on traffic and highways issues. 
 
 
For the Highways Agency 
Mr P Morris 
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A number of shorter proofs were also submitted by members of the public.   
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